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THE TROUBLE WITH COURT-PACKING
NEIL S. SIEGEL†
ABSTRACT
Wide-ranging public discussion of U.S. Supreme Court reform
implicates fundamental questions of constitutional policy, norms, and
law. This Article focuses on the reform proposal that poses the greatest
threat to judicial legitimacy and independence: Court-packing. This
Article contends that there has likely been a constitutional convention
against Court-packing for a long time now, although it is uncertain
whether the convention continues to exist given Senate conduct since
2016. This Article also maintains that Court-packing is not as free from
constitutional difficulty as the conventional wisdom holds, even if the
arguments for its constitutionality are stronger on balance. Most
importantly, this Article offers an analytical framework for thinking
about Court-packing that rests upon a common-ground foundation:
the Court performs critical functions that most Americans want it to
perform; most of the time, it performs these functions better than the
available governmental alternatives; and Court-packing would almost
certainly damage, if not destroy, its ability to continue performing these
functions by impairing its legitimacy and independence. Court-packing
should therefore be reserved for extreme situations in which adding
seats would: (1) respond proportionally to a previous instance of
unjustified Court-packing; (2) restore the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes
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of a large majority of Americans; or (3) meet a national crisis to which
the Court was contributing. Moreover, even when an extreme situation
exists, Congress should ask itself whether it can legislate in other ways
to address pressing problems before packing the Court. Applying this
framework, this Article cuts against the ideological grain of current
debates. As many progressives advocate Court-packing and many
conservatives oppose it, this Article shows there are principled reasons
to resist Court-packing at this time, even if one believes that Senate
Republicans violated an important convention requiring good-faith
consideration of Supreme Court nominees and then added hypocrisy
to their norm violation, and even if one is deeply concerned about the
ideological orientation and methodological assertiveness of the current
Court.
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INTRODUCTION
Justice Antonin Scalia died unexpectedly with nearly a year to go
in Democratic President Barack Obama’s second term. About an hour
after Justice Scalia’s death was publicly confirmed, Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell announced that Senate Republicans would
not consider any Obama nominee to fill Justice Scalia’s seat.1 They
subsequently made good on this promise.2 The next president,
Republican Donald Trump, made three appointments to the Court
over the next four years. At some point during his presidency, Courtpacking became the most thinkable that it had been for many
progressives since the failed Court-packing plan of Democratic
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (“FDR”) in 1937.3 History
suggests that the contemporary debate over Court-packing will not be
the last one.

1. See, e.g., infra notes 219–221 and accompanying text (documenting these facts); Burgess
Everett & Glenn Thrush, McConnell Throws Down the Gauntlet: No Scalia Replacement Under
Obama, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2016, 9:56 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/mitchmcconnell-antonin-scalia-supreme-court-nomination-219248 [https://perma.cc/U7M3-2HYV]
(noting “[t]he swiftness of McConnell’s statement—coming about an hour after Scalia’s death in
Texas had been confirmed”).
2. See 163 CONG. REC. S2442–43 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2017) (recording the Senate’s
confirmation of Republican President Donald Trump’s nominee, then-Judge Neil Gorsuch, to fill
Justice Scalia’s seat).
3. For examples of numerous calls for Court-packing on the ideological left in current
times, see infra notes 7, 13, and accompanying text. For discussion of the 1937 episode, see infra
Part II.A.
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Wide-ranging public discussion of Supreme Court reform
implicates fundamental questions of constitutional policy, norms, and
law, as reflected in the work of the Presidential Commission on the
Supreme Court of the United States. Although the proposals for
reform range widely, this Article focuses on the one that poses the
greatest threat to judicial legitimacy and independence: Court-packing.
This Article’s analytical framework for thinking about Court-packing
and its arguments against it except in genuinely extreme circumstances
rest upon a common-ground foundation: the Court performs functions
that most Americans want it to perform; most of the time, it performs
these functions better than the available governmental alternatives;
and Court-packing would almost certainly damage, if not destroy, its
ability to continue performing these functions.
Court expansion is increasing by statute the number of seats on
the Supreme Court for any of several possible reasons. If those reasons
sound genuinely in good government, then in principle Court
expansion is unproblematic as far as constitutional politics,
constitutional conventions, or constitutional law is concerned.
Examples of good-government reasons for expanding the Court
include enhancing its ability to handle a heavier workload and, until
1869, maintaining the link between the size of the Court and the
structure of the circuit court system.4 If and when there were goodgovernment reasons for altering the size of the Court, one would hope
that there would be bipartisan support for making such a change—and
bipartisan participation in choosing the nominees.
Court expansion can also be accomplished for purposes of Courtpacking. Court-packing can be defined specifically as increasing by
statute the number of seats on the Court due to particular
disagreements with the Court’s decisions. This is what FDR attempted
in 1937. Court-packing can be defined more generally—and more
commonly—as increasing the Court’s size for the purpose of
influencing the Court’s decision-making going forward. This purpose,
among other objectives, is what motivated certain changes to the
Court’s size until 1869.5
4. JOHN V. ORTH, HOW MANY JUDGES DOES IT TAKE TO MAKE A SUPREME COURT? 5
(2006). As discussed infra notes 139–146, in 1801, there was a brief interruption of the connection
between the size of the Court and the structure of the circuit court system. See Act of Feb. 13,
1801, ch. 4, §§ 3, 7, 2 Stat. 89, 89–90.
5. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the
Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 258, 269–72 (2017) [hereinafter Bradley &
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This Article contends that there has likely been a non-legallybinding constitutional convention (or norm) against Court-packing for
a long time now. Opponents of FDR’s plan, including prominent
Democrats, invoked (and thereby solidified) this convention in
opposing the plan. Whether such a convention continues to exist in
light of recent Senate conduct is, however, uncertain. This Article
further argues that Court-packing is not as free from constitutional
difficulty as the conventional wisdom holds, even if the arguments for
its constitutionality are stronger on balance.6
Most importantly, this Article argues that Court-packing is an
extreme act—a break-the-glass-and-pull-the-lever-only-in-case-ofemergency sort of act. Court-packing would significantly undermine
the perception and reality of the Court’s independence and, in almost
all circumstances, risk its legal and public legitimacy. Undermining the
Court’s legitimacy would in turn impair its ability to perform critical
functions that no other governmental institution in the United States,
at this point in its history, is likely to perform more effectively. Courtpacking should therefore be reserved for extreme situations in which
adding seats would: (1) respond proportionally to a previous instance
of unjustified Court-packing; (2) restore the Court’s legitimacy in the
eyes of a large majority of Americans when its legitimacy is threatened
by the Court itself; or (3) meet a national crisis to which the Court was
contributing. Moreover, even when an extreme situation exists,
Congress should ask itself whether it can legislate in other ways to
address pressing problems before packing the Court.
Most current proposals to add seats to the Court are not defended
on good-government grounds. They are instead Court-packing plans.
Although proponents champion such plans based in part on the
Siegel, Judicial Separation of Powers]. Other reasons for changes to the Court’s size prior to 1869
included the good-government concerns noted in the text and a congressional desire to affect the
ability of a particular president to make a nomination. Id. at 271–72. For other discussions of the
early practice, see infra Part III; PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., THE
FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 68–69 (2021) [hereinafter BIDEN COMM’N REPORT], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/12/SCOTUS-Report-Final-12.8.21-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RSB-Z2BW].
6. As Part III.A discusses, the conventional wisdom is that Congress has broad power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, as understood from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), to the present, to set and change the size of the Court regardless of its purpose
in doing so—that is, regardless of whether Congress has good-government reasons or instead
wants to seize ideological control of the Court. The conventional wisdom is based in part on the
understanding that Congress’s purpose is simply irrelevant to the scope of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, just as its purpose is typically irrelevant when it uses other enumerated powers.
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content of the Court’s actual or anticipated decisions, a key rationale
in favor of Court-packing now is that it is justified by the stark
politicization of the Supreme Court confirmation process that began
when Senate Republicans refused to consider the nomination of thenChief Judge Merrick Garland in 2016 on the stated ground that it was
an election year but then confirmed Justice Amy Coney Barrett in
2020.7 The conduct of Senate Republicans was indeed problematic for
many of the same reasons that Court-packing is almost always
problematic. Senate Republicans significantly escalated previous
troubling conduct by both parties with respect to judicial nominations.
It is not clear, however, why the conduct of Senate Republicans
would potentially justify adding four seats (as current Court-packing

7. See, e.g., BIDEN COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 75 (reporting that “[s]ome
proponents of Supreme Court expansion charge that Republican lawmakers since 2016 have
disregarded institutional norms in order to secure a conservative supermajority on the Court,”
and that “[t]hey see expansion of the Court as particularly justified in light of Senate Republicans’
handling of the election-year nominations of Judge Garland and Justice Barrett”); DAVID FARIS,
IT’S TIME TO FIGHT DIRTY: HOW DEMOCRATS CAN BUILD A LASTING MAJORITY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 94 (2018) (arguing that the Democrats should exercise “the Neutron
Option—the expansion of the Supreme Court to whatever number is necessary to secure a liberal
majority”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING BACK THE CONSTITUTION: ACTIVIST JUDGES AND THE
NEXT AGE OF AMERICAN LAW 220–21 (2020) [hereinafter TUSHNET, TAKING BACK THE
CONSTITUTION] (stating that “we can fairly wonder to what extent Court-packing would
undermine judicial legitimacy” and that “in the event that the Court does start to obstruct
progressive policy initiatives, Court-packing might do some good, as Democrats will see things”);
Reform the Supreme Court, DEMAND JUST. [hereinafter DEMAND JUST.] https://demand
justice.org/priorities/supreme-court-reform [https://perma.cc/X4GW-7SDR] (advocating the
addition of four seats to the Court because the “6–3 Republican supermajority . . . is too biased
in favor of special interests and Republican politicians” and because “[o]ur democracy is at risk
from decisions that suppress the right to vote”); Michael J. Klarman, Charles Warren Professor
of L. Hist., Harvard L. Sch., Court Expansion and Other Changes to the Court Composition, before
the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 15 (July
20, 2021) [hereinafter Klarman, Court Expansion], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2021/07/Klarman-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GS6-883M] (contending that “Democrats
today should expand the Court to provide a center-left country with a center-left Court that will
defend democracy, resist voter suppression, permit reasonable regulation of campaign finance,
and cease furthering a neo-Ayn Randian policy agenda that exacerbates economic inequality and
fosters democratic degradation”); Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The Degradation of American
Democracy—and the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10, 247–48 (2020) [hereinafter Klarman,
Foreword] (asserting that the Democrats should pack the Court to undo the Republicans’ theft
of a seat in 2016); Michael J. Klarman, Why Democrats Should Pack the Supreme Court, TAKE
CARE (Oct. 15, 2018), http://takecareblog.com/blog/why-democrats-should-pack-the-supremecourt [https://perma.cc/M9CD-C8TE] (arguing that the “Republicans are already packing the
courts” and that the Democrats should “respond in kind” by expanding the size of the Supreme
Court).
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proposals in Congress urge8), as opposed to two. Moreover, it is not
clear that adding even two seats would be a proportionate response to
the actions of Senate Republicans given the different nature of Courtpacking and the greater magnitude of the harm that it would likely do
to the Court’s ability to perform its functions. Proportionality limits the
damage to the Court’s legitimacy and efficacy while still enabling a
political party to deter or punish misconduct by the other party,
thereby permitting the responding party to safeguard its own
democratic authority to affect the Court’s composition through the
regular appointments process.
In addition, other potential justifications for Court-packing do not
currently appear compelling. At least so far, and notwithstanding the
questions raised about the future by the Court’s arresting decision in
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,9 the Court does not
seem to be squandering its legitimacy in the view of a large majority of
Americans such that packing the Court would likely restore it.10 Nor,
in all likelihood, is there a national crisis to which the Court is
contributing—an emergency situation that stands apart from
mainstream partisan disagreements—that might justify Court-packing.
Even assuming such a crisis exists (the most likely candidate would be
with respect to voting rights and access to the democratic process),
Congress has not first resorted to means that would reduce judicial
legitimacy less. That is, Congress has not legislated to advance its
compelling interest and awaited the Court’s response to the legislation.
The greatest risk to democracy at present is that lies about voter fraud
or other asserted “legal irregularities” will enable theft of the 2024
presidential election. But what seems most likely to prevent such a
nightmare scenario is a broad-based political coalition that includes
democracy-defending Republicans. Court-packing would be so
incendiary that it might render it impossible to form such a coalition.
The recent conduct of Senate Republicans might justify the refusal
of Senate Democrats to consider any Republican Supreme Court
nominees in the years ahead. The conduct of Senate Republicans might
also justify a decision of Senate Democrats to confirm a Democratic

8. See H.R. 2584, 117th Cong. (2021) (proposing to amend Title 28 of the United States
Code to provide for twelve Associate Justices in addition to the Chief Justice); S. 1141, 117th
Cong. (2021) (same).
9. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
10. For discussion, see infra Part V.B.2.
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nominee just before a set of elections or even in the lame-duck session
after them. Moreover, Republican “constitutional hardball” helps
explain public consideration of Court-packing, including through the
work of the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court.11 Finally,
there would likely be value in having a credible threat of Court-packing
if the Court were on the cusp of devastating its own legitimacy or
deepening a national crisis.
But actually pulling the trigger and packing the Court with four
Justices absent extreme circumstances would risk severe damage not
just to the progressive Court that would presumably result but also to
the progressive and conservative Courts of the future. It would also
likely damage U.S. politics by injecting threats or promises of Courtpacking into every election cycle and by unleashing subsequent rounds
of Court-packing whenever the opportunity arose. Even before the
first instance of retaliatory packing took place, there would be cause
for concern about noncompliance with, or nonenforcement of,
Supreme Court decisions. It is easy to forget that judicial review rests
upon a precarious foundation in the United States.12
This Article cuts against the ideological grain of contemporary
debates over Court-packing. There are many calls now by progressives
to pack the Court.13 The work of questioning the wisdom—and the

11. For the Commission’s report, see supra note 5. Constitutional hardball refers partly to
the violation of constitutional norms by politicians to achieve partisan goals. See Mark Tushnet,
Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004) (defining constitutional
hardball as “political claims and practices . . . that are without much question within the bounds
of existing constitutional doctrine and practice but that are nonetheless in some tension with
existing pre-constitutional understandings”).
12. For discussion, see infra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PACK THE COURT! A DEFENSE OF SUPREME COURT
EXPANSION 5 (2021); Nan Aron, President, All. for Just., Testimony, before the PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 11–16 (July 20, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Aron-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QD3G-2QN4]; Christopher Kang, Co-Founder and Chief Couns., Demand Just., Perspectives on
Supreme Court Reform, before the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES (July 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/
Kang-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EFE-TVFK]; Nancy Gertner & Laurence H. Tribe, The
Supreme
Court
Isn’t
Well.
The
Only
Hope
for
a
Cure
Is
More
Justices., W ASH . P OST (Dec. 9, 2021, 5:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/
12/09/expand-supreme-court-laurence-tribe-nancy-gertner [https://perma.cc/5UVP-X477]; Kermit
Roosevelt III, I Spent 7 Months Studying Supreme Court Reform. We Need To Pack the Court
Now, TIME (Dec. 10, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://time.com/6127193/supreme-court-reform-expansion
[https://perma.cc/J998-2VTG]; supra note 7 and accompanying text (quoting progressive advocates
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constitutionality—of Court-packing has largely been performed by
conservatives, who are generally enthusiastic about the composition
and decision-making of the Roberts Court.14 This Article shows that
there are principled reasons to oppose Court-packing at this time, even
if one believes that Senate Republicans violated an important
convention requiring good-faith consideration of Supreme Court
nominees, and even if one is deeply concerned about the ideological
orientation and methodological assertiveness of the current Court.
This Article offers a framework for determining whether and
when Court-packing would be justified that people of different
ideologies and party affiliations could apply in any political era, even if
they disagree about how it should apply in situations such as the past
several years of confirmation politics. Although this framework will
not settle deep ideological or partisan disagreements, it holds the
potential to channel such disagreements into debates that are more
tractable and honest. The framework is offered in the conviction that
the basic stability of U.S. constitutional democracy is of immense social
value; restraints on partisanship, including self-restraints, are essential
to maintaining the stability of this regime; and extraordinary actions
that undermine core structural values and institutions of government
threaten its stability.
Part I explains why Court-packing would likely undermine the
ability, and might undermine the willingness, of the Justices to perform

of Court-packing); supra note 8 and accompanying text (citing Court-packing bills supported by
congressional Democrats).
14. See, e.g., William Baude, Reflections of a Supreme Court Commissioner 3–9 (Dec. 10,
2021) [hereinafter Baude, Reflections] (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3982144 [https://perma.cc/P5BL-BCQK]; Philip Hamburger, Court Packing Is a Dangerous
Game, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2021, 12:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/court-packing-is-adangerous-game-11618505061 [https://perma.cc/29DA-MBR5]; M. Todd Henderson, CourtPacking Is Unconstitutional, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 30, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/
court-packing-unconstitutional-opinion-1543290 [https://perma.cc/2WA7-5J9T]; Michael W.
McConnell, Richard & Frances Mallery Professor, Stanford L. Sch., Written Testimony, before the
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 1–3 (June 30,
2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/McConnell-SCOTUS-Commissi
on-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/ABS3-3J2C]; Stephen E. Sachs, Antonin Scalia Professor of
L., Harvard L. Sch., Closing Reflections on the Supreme Court and Constitutional Governance,
before the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 6,
16 (July 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Sachs-Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UG6Z-52DA]; infra notes 154–156, 168–173, and accompanying text (discussing
the Commission testimony of Professor Randy Barnett and a blog post by Professor Michael
Rappaport). Congressional Republicans have introduced numerous joint resolutions calling for a
constitutional amendment that would fix the number of Justices at nine. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 11,
117th Cong. (2021); S.J. Res. 9, 117th Cong. (2021).
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critical tasks. Part II argues that Court-packing has likely been
prohibited by a constitutional convention, but that it is uncertain
whether this norm still stands. Part III contends that Court-packing is
not entirely free from constitutional difficulty. Part IV maintains that
Court-packing is justified in three extreme situations. Part V argues
that current circumstances do not justify Court-packing.
I. COURT-PACKING AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COURT
This initial Part accomplishes three purposes. It first argues that
packing the Court would almost certainly undermine the ability of the
Justices to execute responsibilities that no other governmental
institution is likely to execute better. It next contends that packing the
Court might also undermine the willingness of the Justices to execute
their responsibilities. It then examines who can potentially be
persuaded by the arguments offered here—specifically, it argues that
not only defenders of judicial review can potentially be persuaded, but
some opponents as well. It also observes that certain advocates of
Court-packing who critique judicial review appear to agree that
packing the Court could damage it.
A. Court-Packing and Judicial Ability to Perform Key Functions
1. Functions. The Supreme Court, regardless of its membership at
a particular time, performs vital functions in the U.S. constitutional
system. It ensures the supremacy of federal law over state law,15 brings
uniformity to the interpretation of federal law,16 and settles interstate
disputes.17 It polices certain aspects of the constitutional relationship
between Congress and the executive,18 and it protects a meaningful

15. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (insisting on desegregation of the public
schools in Arkansas without delay).
16. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015) (resolving a circuit split over the
constitutionality of state prohibitions on same-sex marriage).
17. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Tennessee, 142 S. Ct. 31, 33 (2021) (holding that the waters of the
Middle Claiborne Aquifer are subject to the judicial remedy of equitable apportionment and
dismissing Mississippi’s complaint without leave to amend).
18. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (identifying three zones into which presidential action may fall and describing
presidential “power [a]s at its lowest ebb” when the president acts in the face of a congressional
prohibition).
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measure of state regulatory autonomy.19 The Court provides a check
against the dramatic expansion of executive power since the start of the
twentieth century, a development that poses a risk of authoritarianism
if a would-be authoritarian ascends to the presidency.20 The Justices
are expected to vindicate constitutional rights to liberty and equality
and to help preserve democracy by maintaining the structure of
democratic politics and by protecting process rights such as speech,
association, and voting. The Court’s exercise of judicial review satisfies
the demands of Americans for constitutional change more frequently
than the formal Article V process permits. Constitutional adjudication
is also one crucial way in which U.S. society settles conflicts over
fundamental values for the time being—whether over abortion
restrictions, gay rights, or gun rights—without resorting to violence.
And the Court plays a central role in sustaining the rule of law—the
ideal, too often taken for granted in this country, that both the
government and governed are restrained by law.21
To be sure, the Court is not the only governmental institution
responsible for accomplishing these constitutional objectives. For
example, institution building by Congress also produces significant
constitutional change (see, for example, the modern Justice
Department and the administrative state), and congressional
legislation also protects significant individual rights (see, for example,
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965).22 This
was especially so when Congress was less dysfunctional than it is in the
modern era of polarized politics, but Congress still passes major

19. See, e.g., Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018)
(reaffirming the Court’s anticommandeering doctrine, which has been invoked by both liberal
and conservative states to refuse participation in the enforcement of certain federal laws).
20. See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431 (2020) (holding 7–2 that Article II and the
Supremacy Clause do not categorically preclude, or require a heightened standard for, the
issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting president); see also Trump v. Mazars USA, 140
S. Ct. 2019, 2036 (2020) (holding 7–2 that although congressional subpoenas for the president’s
information may be enforceable, the court below did not take adequate account of the significant
separation of powers concerns implicated by subpoenas from the House of Representatives
seeking President Trump’s financial records).
21. See, e.g., Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections After the Collapse of
Communism, 15 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 633, 642 (1990) (describing the rule of law as “a crucial and
historically rare mode of restraint on power by law”).
22. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 5–6, 33 (2011).
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legislation today.23 Legislation also manages value conflict
nonviolently.
In addition, the Court does not execute each of its responsibilities
well all or even most of the time. In the contemporary United States,
however, the Court has proven itself to be the most effective
governmental institution in performing most of the above functions.
For instance, the Court is more likely to hold governmental institutions
accountable for violations of the constitutional rights of individuals and
groups that lack political power than are legislatures or executives.

23. For a nonexhaustive list of significant federal legislation enacted since 2000, see
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note); No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115
Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. and other titles); Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and other titles); Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 8 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and other titles);
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001–1006, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739–2744
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 42
U.S.C., and other titles); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.);
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and other titles); Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. and other titles); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and other titles);
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and
other titles); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and other titles); Every Student
Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 20 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and other titles); Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat.
2054 (2017) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 30
U.S.C., 37 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 43 U.S.C.); America’s Water Infrastructure Act of 2018, Pub. L.
No. 115-270, 132 Stat. 3765 (to be codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and other
titles); Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134
Stat. 281 (2020) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and other
titles); Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 116-139,
134 Stat. 620 (2020) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 933 and scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15
U.S.C.); American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and other titles); and Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L.
No. 117-159, 136 Stat. 1313 (2022) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and other
titles); Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-169 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. and other titles).
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Prisoners, criminal defendants, racial minorities, and political
minorities are likely to fare better before even a very conservative
Court than they are before most state legislatures or Congress, and outof-staters are more likely to fare better before such a Court than they
are before state legislatures.24 The Court is also more likely to police
the democratic process for blatant attempts by the political parties to
unconstitutionally entrench themselves in power than are the parties
in government themselves. For example, as discussed further below,
the Court had little use for the Trump Campaign’s bogus claims of
election fraud after the 2020 election.25 Often, critics of the Court focus
on its failings without asking whether the political branches or state
governments are generally likely to do better.26 For example, forceful
and eloquent critiques of the Court’s historic racism and bias in favor
of the wealthy do not tend to emphasize the horrific racism and
socioeconomic bias of past presidents and members of Congress—who,
after all, were responsible for putting every Justice on the Court.27
There are likely several reasons why the Court is generally best
able to perform the above functions. For example, differences in
professional socialization and role morality between politicians and
judges likely matter, as does the difference between the law-making
function of politicians (which is awash in the exercise of discretion) and

24. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 276–84 (2014)
(forcefully critiquing the Court’s historic exercise of the power of judicial review but nonetheless
defending the continued existence of the institution because “those without political power have
nowhere to turn except the judiciary for the protection of their constitutional rights,” and, in
particular, naming prisoners, criminal defendants, racial and political minorities, out-of-staters,
and urban dwellers before the Court’s reapportionment decisions). For a recent example of
Chemerinsky’s point, see Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020) (per curiam), denying qualified
immunity to prison officers who were sued by an inmate after being held for several days in two
shockingly unsanitary prison cells. Id. at 53. The vote was 7–1, with Justice Clarence Thomas
dissenting and Justice Amy Coney Barrett not participating. Id.
25. For discussion, see infra note 68 and accompanying text.
26. See Noah Feldman, Felix Frankfurter Professor of L., Harvard L. Sch., Written
Statement, before the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, at 2 (June 30, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/FeldmanPresidential-Commission-6-25-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU3Q-DAQJ] (“The strongest opposing
view, which sees the court in its current role as fundamentally counter-majoritarian and even antidemocratic, depends on the hope (or fantasy) that some other abstract entity—perhaps ‘the
people’—would somehow fulfill the Court’s functions if the Court no longer did so.”).
27. For one such critique of judicial review, see Nikolas Bowie, Assistant Professor of L.,
Harvard L. Sch., Written Statement, before the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 2–12 (June 30, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-cont
ent/uploads/2021/06/Bowie-SCOTUS-Testimony-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RQR-CDHA].
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the law-interpreting and applying functions of judges (which is not
supposed to be).28 But the primary reason why the Court is best able to
perform these functions is that the Court is generally more distant from
partisan politics than the available alternatives. Not needing to be reelected to stay in office, the Justices need not fear the electoral
ramifications of casting votes that disappoint powerful politicians—or
the base—of the political party that appointed them. State
governments and citizens may strongly prefer state law to federal law.
Presidents may seek to exceed the bounds of executive power.
Majorities may seek to squelch unpopular speech and violate other
rights of outvoted minorities. The government and the governed alike
may not wish to be bound by law. The Justices can push back against
each of these groups without losing their jobs. By contrast, the current
occupants of Congress, the White House, and state governments can
lose their jobs if they take politically unpopular actions to vindicate the
most important of values.
To say that the Court is generally more distant from partisan
politics than the available alternatives is not to say that the Justices
never succumb to the temptation of partisanship. Sometimes, they do.
Nor is it to say that the Justices are apolitical in the sense of not
exercising interpretive discretion. They often exercise discretion,
which leaves room for ideological commitments, values, beliefs, priors,
and life experiences that inform their decision-making. The notion that
“[c]ourts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing”29
is as untenable as the insistence of the attitudinalists that only ideology

28. For discussion of professional socialization and role morality in the judicial and political
contexts, see generally Neil S. Siegel, After the Trump Era: A Constitutional Role Morality for
Presidents and Members of Congress, 107 GEO. L.J. 109 (2018) [hereinafter Siegel, After the
Trump Era].
29. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (“Courts are
the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing.”). Soon-to-be Chief Justice John Roberts
asserted during his confirmation hearings that Justices are like baseball umpires:
Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are like
umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a
judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role.
Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United
States Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of Judge John G.
Roberts, Jr.). For problems with the umpire analogy, see generally Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat:
On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701 (2007), explaining judges cannot
simply apply rules like umpires because they usually cannot agree on what the rules are when
adjudicating the most important cases.
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determines outcomes—that law is just a fig leaf.30 There is much truth
to the basic position of the historical institutionalist school of political
science that “judges and others try to make the best decision from a
value or policy perspective that is permitted by legal text, history, and
precedent”31 as well as other interpretive modalities, including
inferences from the constitutional structure.32
To claim that the Court is less partisan than the alternatives is to
suggest that, notwithstanding all of the Court’s arguably partisan warts,
there are meaningful differences in how the Justices generally execute
their responsibilities and how members of Congress do. It is to argue
that Chief Justice John Roberts is not political in the same way, and to
the same extent, as Senator Mitch McConnell; nor is Justice Elena
Kagan political in the same way, and to the same extent, as Senator
Chuck Schumer. It is to observe that the Republican appointees on the
Court were far less beholden to President Trump and the Trump
administration than were the Republicans in Congress.33 And it is to
maintain that politicians may permissibly seek to advance the fortunes
of their political party, while Justices may not permissibly act with a
partisan motivation. A Justice with profoundly different ideological
commitments from the evaluator need not be deemed a failure as a
jurist. A Justice who behaves as a partisan is a failed judge.
In trying to perform its functions, the Court faces a potentially
significant impediment: powerful politicians and the general public
may not be willing to abide the Court’s decisions.34 Although it may

30. According to the attitudinalist model of judicial decision-making in political science,
“justices make decisions by considering the facts of the case in light of their ideological attitudes
and values.” JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 110 (2002).
31. HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM, VOLUME ONE: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 17 (3d ed. 2022). The
category of history can be further subdivided into originalist argumentation, historical
governmental practice, American tradition, and American antitradition.
32. For discussions of structural reasoning, see generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969) and PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION ch. 6 (1982).
33. See infra notes 63, 68, 285, and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court decisions
or nondecisions that went against Trump or his administration).
34. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), Chief Justice John Marshall rebuked
Jacksonian attempts to remove Native Americans by holding that the federal government had the
authority to conclude treaties with tribes and that states lacked sovereignty over land given to the
tribes by such treaties. Id. at 579–96. In response to the decision, President Andrew Jackson may
or may not have said, “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” Jackson
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not seem like it anymore given the authority of the modern Court,
judicial review rests upon an insecure footing in the U.S. democratic
system; nine unelected, unrepresentative, and relatively unaccountable
individuals are empowered to override decisions made by elected
officials—federal, state, and local. This “countermajoritarian
difficulty,” which concerns the legitimacy of having unelected judges
override the choices of today’s legislative majorities based on judicial
interpretations of the Constitution, has long dominated much
theorizing in constitutional law. Professor Alexander Bickel coined
this phrase less than a decade after the Court risked its public
legitimacy by deciding Brown v. Board of Education35 against powerful
forces of racial subordination. “The root difficulty,” Bickel wrote, “is
that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.”36

definitely did say, however, that “[t]he decision of the [S]upreme [C]ourt has fell stillborn, and
they find that it cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate.” See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 33–34 (2007) (quoting ANDREW
JACKSON, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON 430 (John Bassett ed., 1929)). Jackson
did not endeavor to enforce the decision, id., and Georgia ignored it with impunity. Stephen
Breyer, The Cherokee Indians and the Supreme Court, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 215, 224 (2000).
35. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). Much scholarship in law and political science questions Bickel’s
claim that the Court is a countermajoritarian institution, at least in any long-term sense. See
generally, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009)
[hereinafter FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE] (“It is the meaning of the Constitution itself
that is up for grabs, and judicial power is nothing more than a pawn in that battle.”). Much other
scholarship disagrees, emphasizing that between the present and the long term, the Court can
issue many important decisions that lack majority support in the country:
To see the persistence of the countermajoritarian difficulty, consider all the
qualifications that Friedman builds into the most careful (and most defensible) version
of his central claim: “[T]he Court’s decisions on salient issues have tended to come into
line over time with popular preferences.” It is not all of the Court’s decisions that he
has in mind, but only those on salient issues. The Court decides many issues that are
consequential but not especially salient. Moreover, Friedman argues that the Court’s
decisions on salient issues tend to be accountable to the popular will, not that they
always align with popular preferences. Still further, he maintains that this alignment, to
the extent that it occurs, happens over time—which is to say, in the long run, in the end.
The problem, of course, is that we will all be dead in the end, and in the meantime we
may have to live with some judicial decisions that possess substantial staying power.
All of Friedman’s qualifications are well conceived, but each pays tribute to the very
difficulty he means to deny.
Neil S. Siegel, A Coase Theorem for Constitutional Theory, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 583, 594–95
(footnote omitted) (reviewing FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra); see generally
Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103
(identifying six problems with the majoritarian thesis and arguing that the longer average tenure
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2. Legitimacy. Accordingly, to perform the functions set forth
above, the Court requires a relatively high level of legitimacy.
Legitimacy always exists in the minds of an audience. Legal legitimacy
is legitimacy in the eyes of legal professionals, and public legitimacy is
legitimacy in the eyes of the general public.37 The Court requires both
forms of legitimacy.38 (Note that the legitimation of the Court is not an
end in itself but a means to the accomplishment of the important
constitutional ends described above.) The Court has no actual power
of its own to coerce presidents, police officers, and public and private
parties. For enforcement, it depends on the executive. For compliance,
it depends on both the enforcement efforts of the executive and the
willingness of litigants and similarly situated people to abide decisions
they may vigorously oppose. Enforcement and compliance have not
always existed in this country (consider, for example, massive
resistance to Brown39), and they may not always exist.40 They endure
only insofar as presidents, Congresses, state officials, and private
litigants continue to accept the legitimacy of the Court—only insofar
as they continue to enforce or comply with decisions with which they
may strongly disagree.41
of Justices today renders even more random any connection between the appointment of Justices
and the outcomes of elections).
37. Richard Fallon observes:
When legitimacy functions as a legal concept, legitimacy and illegitimacy are gauged
by legal norms. As measured by sociological criteria, the Constitution or a claim of
legal authority is legitimate insofar as it is accepted (as a matter of fact) as deserving of
respect or obedience—or, in a weaker usage . . . insofar as it is otherwise acquiesced in.
Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1790–91 (2005).
38. Professor Barry Friedman emphasizes the importance of both forms of legitimacy:
[T]he work of constitutional judges must have both “legal” and “social” legitimacy.
Social legitimacy, as distinguished from legal legitimacy, looks beyond jurisprudential
antecedents of constitutional decisions and asks whether those decisions are widely
understood to be the correct ones given the social and economic milieu in which they
are rendered.
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of
Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (2001) (footnote omitted).
39. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (stating that the case “raises questions of
the highest importance to the maintenance of our federal system of government” because “it
involves actions by the Governor and Legislature of Arkansas upon the premise that they are not
bound by our holding in Brown”).
40. With respect to nonenforcement of Supreme Court decisions by the executive, see
FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 36, at 91–95 (discussing President Andrew
Jackson’s lack of support for the Supreme Court’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia, which ruled
in favor of the Cherokee) and supra note 34 and accompanying text (same).
41. See JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 118 (1995)
(“[I]nstitutions survive on acceptance.”); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the
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Politicians have long had a number of reasons for supporting the
institution of judicial review.42 One main reason in the contemporary
United States is that the American people as a whole—the voters that
these politicians face—generally support the Court as an institution
and approve of the power that it possesses.43 Americans support the
Court in significant part because they believe that it is not as partisan
as the political branches are. They believe that, to a greater extent than
politicians, the Justices make decisions according to law as best they
understand the law and in light of their special knowledge of the law,
regardless of the consequences for the party that appointed them.44 If
the Justices fail to satisfy these broadly shared expectations,45 they will
reduce, and eventually lose, the significant amount of diffuse support
they retain,46 even if there is less support than there used to be.47
Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 307 (2003) (“Legitimacy is the property that a rule
or an authority has when others feel obligated to defer voluntarily.”).
42. A large literature in political science examines why courts possess authority. Answers
tend to focus on governing elites—such as presidents and leaders of Congress—and the needs of
their political regime. Some of the conclusions are that politicians support judicial authority
because courts limit the power of local majorities; spread the values of the governing regime;
decide controversial questions that governing elites would prefer not to decide themselves
because the questions fracture their coalitions; and protect the interests of these elites when they
are out of power. For a prominent example of such work, see generally WHITTINGTON, supra note
34. For a brief summary of the literature, see GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 22.
43. See Jamal Greene, Giving the Constitution to the Courts, 117 YALE L.J. 886, 911 (2008)
(reviewing WHITTINGTON, supra note 34) (suggesting that “members of the public, more than
institutional political actors, have laid the foundations for judicial supremacy”). Among
Democrats, however, support for the Court has recently plummeted, resulting in the largest gulf
to date between the parties with respect to their views of the Court. See Mohamed Younis,
Democrats’ Approval of Supreme Court at Record-Low 13%, GALLUP (Aug. 2, 2022),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/395387/democrats-approval-supreme-court-record-low.aspx [https://
perma.cc/UPV9-LGR8].
44. Evidence of these beliefs can be found in the fact that Justices and Supreme Court
nominees appeal to them in overstated ways, sometimes to great effect. See, e.g., supra note 29
and accompanying text (quoting Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States
and Chief Justice Roberts); cf. infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text (quoting Professors
Robert Post and Reva Siegel’s description of what Americans believe about the legal authority
of the Constitution).
45. Cf. Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and
Neutral Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 604 (1963) (“Political institutions survive and
prosper to the extent that they satisfy widely held expectations about them.”).
46. Diffuse support is “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to
accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging
to their wants.” DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 273 (1965).
47. See, e.g., Maya Sen, Professor of Pub. Pol’y, John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard
Univ., Written Testimony, before the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, at 2 (June 30, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/
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In seeking to satisfy public expectations, the Justices cannot
simply don robes, sit in a building adorned with columns, and rely on
fooling Americans. In making periodic judgments about whether the
Court remains worthy of respect, members of the public rely in part on
the judgments of legal experts, who read, convey to the media, and
opine publicly on the contents of the Court’s decisions. Legal experts
are not easily foolable, and, unless they are acting as partisans
themselves, they are unlikely to defend the Court’s decisions if they
view them as partisan.48
To be clear, this account is compatible with the truth that the
Court’s public legitimacy is also a function of the public’s basic
agreement—or lack of vehement disagreement—with the results of
many of its decisions.49 Indeed, to maintain its legal and public
legitimacy, the Court must balance its regular commitment to legal
analysis, free of partisan taint, against its occasional practice of
statesmanship—that is, its occasional modifications of its legal
judgments for the sake of diffusing conflict and maintaining the public
legitimacy of the Court.50 Legal legitimacy requires devotion to legal
norms, and public legitimacy requires both devotion to legal norms and
attention to popular beliefs about the Constitution. Americans tend to
want judicial umpires who need not always call the game their way, but
who do not always call the game the other way.

2021/06/Sen-Written-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF37-W7AT] (noting “a steady increase in
disapproval of the Court and skepticism about its potential rulings”).
48. For suggestive (but limited) evidence that members of the public are affected by the
judgments of law professors, see Michael J. Nelson & James L. Gibson, Has Trump Trumped the
Courts?, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 32, 32, 38–39 (2018), reporting that, in an experiment embedded in a
nationally representative survey of Americans, the greatest decline in support for the Court
resulted from exposure to criticism by law professors that the Court’s decisions are politicized,
not from exposure to the same criticism by President Trump. For a critique of this study and
others like it, see David Fontana, How Do People Think About the Supreme Court When They
Care?, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 50, 51–52 (2018), observing that “[s]cholars have not sufficiently
measured . . . how people think about the Supreme Court when they care about the Court,” even
though “it is harder to believe in the Court” when it “has done something that one knows of and
dislikes,” and “[i]t is also in that situation where predictions are most important to make because
the Court is most threatened.”
49. See Friedman, supra note 38 (“The proper lesson of Lochner instructs us that, even
where it is possible to identify a jurisprudential basis for judicial decisions, if those familiar with
the Court’s decisions do not believe those decisions to be socially correct, the work of judges will
be seen as illegitimate.”).
50. See generally, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV.
959 (2008) (defining judicial statesmanship and arguing that it defines a virtue in the role of a
judge).
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Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel have coined the phrase
“democratic constitutionalism” to “express the paradox that
constitutional authority depends on both its democratic responsiveness
and its legitimacy as law.”51 “Americans,” they observe, “want their
Constitution to have the authority of law, and they understand law to
be distinct from politics.”52 In addition, they write, Americans
“understand that the rule of law is rooted in professional practices that
are distinct from popular politics and that will often require
divergences between the Court’s judgments about the Constitution and
their own.”53 Post and Siegel insist, however, that if Americans come
to view the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution as
“wholly unresponsive” to their own, then they “will in time come to
regard it as illegitimate and oppressive, and they will act to repudiate
it as they did during the New Deal.”54
For the Court to maintain its broad legal and public legitimacy,
Americans must perceive it as enjoying a significant measure of
independence from the political branches. Because the president
nominates individuals to serve as Justices, and because senators often
engage in partisan fights over their confirmations,55 Americans surely
understand that the political branches influence the Court’s decisionmaking as vacancies arise. This knowledge has proven compatible with
the perception of the public and the legal community that the Justices
are generally less partisan than the politicians who put them on the
Court. Also compatible with this perception is the Court’s occasional
practice of statesmanship, which, like the nomination and confirmation
process, can increase the Court’s public legitimacy by reducing the
distance between the Court’s view of the Constitution and the public’s.
But unless the public comes to believe that the Court has gone off the
rails or some other crisis situation exists, it is another matter entirely
for Congress to regulate the Court in such a way that the public regards

51. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25, 27 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
52. Id. at 27.
53. Id. at 27–28.
54. Id. at 28. For fuller development of the theory, see generally Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
For a similar view, see BALKIN, supra note 22, at 71.
55. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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it as having been utterly politicized.56 If the public concludes that the
Justices are no longer exercising independent judgment, a successor
president or a defiant state governor might gamble and refuse to
enforce or comply with a closely divided, controversial Supreme Court
decision. Such a refusal could succeed in the court of public opinion.57
The final link in this chain of reasoning from constitutional
functions to legal and public legitimacy to the perception of judicial
independence is that Court-packing severely undermines the
perception of judicial independence. As noted, Court-packing is not
motivated by genuine good-government reasons, whether sounding in
increases in caseload or the creation of new circuits. Rather, the
primary purpose of packing the Court is to alter its substantive
decision-making all at once by appointing Justices who are likely to cast
votes that are aligned with the wishes of the president and Congress.
(Part II explains the significance of this formulation, which
distinguishes Court-packing from ideological uses of the regular
appointments process.) To be sure, it does not strictly follow as a
logical matter that politicizing the Court through packing will
undermine public perceptions of judicial independence. Public
perceptions are empirical facts of the matter, not the result of analytical
reasoning. But the foregoing prediction appears sound. For example,
as discussed in Part II.A, FDR’s Court-packing plan encountered
fierce opposition within his own political party precisely because it
undermined the perception of judicial independence.
Court-packing not only damages the perceived independence of
the Court—it also threatens its actual independence. Once the Court
is seriously threatened with packing (or has been packed), the Justices
will have good cause to decide cases in a manner that is subservient to
the wishes of the political party in power, at least during periods of
unified government, for fear of the cascading consequences of Court56. For some experimental evidence that public beliefs about the Court are negatively
affected by the perception that it has been politicized, see Nelson & Gibson, supra note 48, at 39,
reporting that the greatest decline in support for the Court resulted from exposure to criticism by
law professors that the Court’s decisions are politicized, not that they are legally incorrect.
57. Bickel wrote that southern leaders who resisted Brown “understood and acted upon an
essential truth, which we do not often have occasion to observe,” which is that:
The Supreme Court’s law . . . could not in our system prevail—not merely in the very
long run, but within the decade—if it ran counter to deeply felt popular needs or
convictions, or even if it was opposed by a determined and substantial minority and
received with indifference by the rest of the country.
BICKEL, supra note 36, at 258.
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packing (or further packing). These consequences are likely to include
an increased risk of nonenforcement of the Court’s decisions, of
noncompliance with its decisions, and of diminution of each Justice’s
voting power. Court-packing is a strategy commonly used in other
countries to undermine liberal democracy—including Venezuela,
Bolivia, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey—precisely because it erodes
barriers to the concentration of power in the hands of the ruling party.58
Anyone who worries that there are authoritarian tendencies present in
contemporary U.S. politics should give serious consideration to this
risk of Court-packing.59
B. Court-Packing and Judicial Willingness to Perform Key Functions
In addition to compromising the ability of the Court to execute
responsibilities that it is best situated to execute, Court-packing risks
undermining the willingness of the Justices to do so. One should be as
concerned about what is going on in the minds of the Justices as one is
about what is going on in the minds of the public. To reiterate, there
are meaningful differences in how the Justices generally do their jobs
and how members of Congress do. It is in everyone’s best interests to
try to preserve these differences. For example, we would not be better
off as a nation if a Court majority—appointed by presidents of the
same party—were willing to push back against presidents of that party
only as often as a Congress of the same party were willing to push back.
Severely politicized courts in other countries are not the envy of the
world.
Especially during the current era of partisan hyper-polarization
and mutual distrust,60 the most difficult challenge for the Justices—
each of whom has survived a partisan and possibly bitter confirmation
process—is to avoid taking partisan sides. The challenge is to vote and
otherwise act like their robes are black, not red or blue. This means,
for example, that the fact that the party that appointed certain Justices

58. A recent article reports that “court-packing has flourished all over the world” and that
“Bolivian, Hungarian, Polish, and Turkish as well as Venezuelan political leaders have recently
employed various strategies to stack their courts with loyal judges.” David Kosa & Katarína
Šipulová, How To Fight Court-Packing?, 6 CONST. STUD. 133, 133 (2020).
59. For two books that emphasize the relationship between Court-packing and democratic
backsliding, see generally TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY (2019) and STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE
(2018).
60. For definitions of these and related terms, see infra note 293.
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wants them to vote a certain way in a case should have no bearing on
how they approach the case. It also means that the Justices should take
no account of the effects of their decisions on the electoral fortunes of
the party that appointed them. To repeat an earlier point, elected
officials are not expected to be similarly constrained. (The importance
of trying to meet this challenge, by the way, counts against reform
proposals that would designate a certain number of seats on the Court
for each political party.61) Critics of the Court may be quick to dismiss
this aspiration as naïve, but their criticism of the Court or individual
Justices for being partisan (in contrast to being profoundly wrong)
implies that it is both possible and desirable for the Justices not to be
partisan—or to be less so.62 Given the nature and magnitude of the
partisan impact on the Court that Court-packing would likely have, the
Justices on a packed Court might be less willing to try to meet this
challenge than they would be on a Court that had not been packed.
To put the point more concretely, at least some Republicanappointed Justices might become politically radicalized if four
Democratic appointees were added to the Court overnight. Although
these Democratic appointees (depending upon who they were) might
try to blunt this effect and shore up the Court’s legitimacy by voting
and writing less ambitiously than they otherwise would, it is difficult to
imagine that they would agree to restrict voting rights and abortion
rights, expand gun rights, etc. Moreover, these Democratic appointees
might themselves become radicalized once unified Republican
government resulted in further mass-packing.
This concern about radicalization of the Justices remains real even
if one believes that certain Justices will not meet the challenge of
nonpartisanship regardless of whether the Court is packed. It is unduly
cynical to believe that most of the Justices will not meet this challenge
most of the time—or that the level of partisanship displayed by most
of the Justices cannot become appreciably worse. There is important
evidence to the contrary, including the conclusion of four Republican
appointees that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a constitutional

61. For two such proposals, see Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How To Save the
Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148, 181–205 (2019).
62. For an example of such criticism, see DEMAND JUST., supra note 7, insisting that “[t]he
Supreme Court has been captured by partisan, Republican interests,” that “[w]e need structural
court reform to depoliticize the Court once and for all,” and that “[a]dding four seats is the
solution.”
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challenge to the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),63 notwithstanding the
relentless opposition of the Republican Party to the ACA since it was
enacted in 2010.64 Another example is the Court’s monumental holding
the term prior—in a majority opinion written or joined by two
Republican appointees—that Title VII prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.65
Although the reaction to this decision among Republican senators was
mixed,66 Title VII was not previously amended to include express
prohibitions on sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination
due to Republican opposition, not Democratic opposition.67 Moreover,
by most accounts, the federal courts—and the Justices—performed
well during the controversies surrounding the 2020 presidential
elections, regardless of the political affiliations of the judges.68 One can,
63. California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2112 (2021).
64. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act Entrenchment,
108 GEO. L.J. 495, 518 (2020) (“The Republican Party . . . quickly made ACA opposition a
‘loyalty litmus test.’” (quoting Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in
Healthcare for?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1759 (2018))).
65. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
66. See, e.g., Ted Barrett, Manu Raju & Lauren Fox, Key GOP Senators Have No Qualms
with Supreme Court’s Decision To Ban LGBTQ Discrimination in the Workplace, CNN (June 15,
2020, 7:29 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/15/politics/gop-senators-reaction-supreme-courtruling/index.html [https://perma.cc/J8X9-KXAY] (describing the different reactions of different
Republican senators, many of whom were positive about the decision, some of whom were
negative, and some of whom expressed no opinion).
67. See, e.g., Katelyn Burns, Where LGBTQ Equality Legislation Goes To Die, NEW
REPUBLIC (June 30, 2021), https://newrepublic.com/article/162861/lgbtq-equality-act-joe-manch
in-compromise-betrayal [https://perma.cc/KLP3-WNYH] (documenting “near-complete Republican
opposition” in Congress to equality protections for members of the LGBTQ community since the
1990s).
68. See, e.g., William Cummings, Joey Garrison & Jim Sergent, By the Numbers: President
Donald Trump’s Failed Efforts To Overturn the Election, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2021, 10:00
AM), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/01/06/trumps-failedefforts-overturn-election-numbers/4130307001 [https://perma.cc/UF7H-ENB5] (discussing the
overwhelming failures of suits challenging the 2020 presidential election and noting that the
decisions came from both “Democratic-appointed and Republican-appointed judges—including
federal judges appointed by Trump”); Colleen Long & Ed White, Trump Thought Courts Were
Key To Winning. Judges Disagreed., AP NEWS (Dec. 8, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/94on
ald-trump-courts-election-results-e1297d874f45d2b14bc99c403abd0457 [https://perma.cc/6TQA27M7] (noting that judges, both Republican and Democratic appointees, “have been among the
harshest critics of the legal arguments put forth by Trump’s legal team, often dismissing them with
scathing language of repudiation”); Nina Totenberg & Barbara Sprunt, Supreme Court Shuts
Door on Texas Suit Seeking to Overturn Election, NPR (Dec. 11, 2020, 6:38 PM), https://
www.npr.org/2020/12/11/945617913/supreme-court-shuts-door-on-trump-election-prospe
cts [https://perma.cc/XEX2-A3BF] (discussing the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear cases
challenging the results of the 2020 presidential election).
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of course, dismiss this piece of evidence by observing that the legal and
factual arguments presented by the legal team supporting former
President Trump were baseless. In a more politicized judicial system,
however, the strength of the arguments might not matter, just as they
sometimes seem not to matter in Congress. A Court packed with
Republican appointees might well have accepted Trump’s claims.
Similarly, in Trump v. Thompson,69 eight Justices concluded that
the National Archives was required to turn over former President
Trump’s presidential papers to the United States House Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol.70 Professor Laurence Tribe, an advocate of Court-packing,
dismisses this piece of evidence as “reveal[ing] only that the [J]ustices
are, in the end, masters of their craft and know that their power
requires them to act as lawyers.”71 One difficulty with such dismissals
is that they can always be invoked. Another difficulty is that they fail
to register the restraining effect on the Justices of their need to act like
lawyers. Presidents and members of Congress are not similarly
constrained.
C. The Relationship Between Views on Court-Packing and Views on
Judicial Review
Defenders and some opponents of judicial review alike can
potentially be persuaded by the arguments against Court-packing
offered here. These arguments build significantly from the premise that
the Court generally, and judicial review specifically, is mostly a
valuable institution in U.S. constitutional democracy. Although this
Part has offered some arguments in support of this premise, it seeks
mainly to convince those who agree that the Court can, and often does,
serve vital functions. This is the common-ground foundation upon
which this Article rests. Common ground is not, however, unanimous
ground. It must be acknowledged that this Article will not speak to all
opponents of judicial review, some of whom will dispute the claim that
the Court has proven itself to be the most effective governmental
institution in achieving most of the goals described at the beginning of

69. Trump v. Thompson, 142 S. Ct. 680 (2022).
70. Id. at 680.
71. Laurence H. Tribe, Politicians in Robes, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 10, 2022)
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2022/03/10/politicians-in-robes-justice-breyer-tribe [https://
perma.cc/D5AT-4695].
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this Part.72 It must also be acknowledged that the argument offered
here has not done nearly enough to refute the case against judicial
review.
Note, however, that the functions of the Court are not limited to
judicial review. The Court plays a critical role in interpreting federal
statutes and in reviewing the consistency of administrative action with
federal statutes.73 Note as well that some opponents of judicial review
of acts of Congress may defend judicial review of executive action,
whether national or state. They may also defend judicial review of state
legislation. Accordingly, this Article’s common-ground foundation is
broader than it may seem if one focuses on opponents of judicial review
of federal legislation.
As for the Court’s harshest critics, it seems fair to observe that
they have less logical reason to worry that Court-packing would
damage the Court. Notably, some (although by no means all) of the
strongest academic proponents of Court-packing are also some of the
most committed believers in legal indeterminacy and some of the
greatest skeptics of judicial review. For example, Professor Michael
Klarman characterizes the meaning of the Constitution as typically
indeterminate in cases that come before the Supreme Court,74 and he
voiced skepticism about judicial review during his testimony before the

72. For a critique of judicial review as antidemocratic historically and theoretically, see
generally Bowie, supra note 27. For another prominent critique of judicial review, see generally
Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006),
arguing that judicial review is democratically illegitimate and does not better protect rights than
legislatures, at least in societies with well-functioning democratic institutions and a populace that
takes rights seriously.
73. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (holding that Title
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination includes prohibitions on sexual-orientation and genderidentity discrimination); Biden v. Missouri, 142 S. Ct. 647, 650 (2022) (granting the applications
to stay the two injunctions that barred the regulation issued by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, which requires facilities participating in Medicare and Medicaid to ensure that
their employees are vaccinated against COVID–19, unless they are eligible for a medical or
religious exemption); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health
Admin., 142 S. Ct. 661, 662–63 (2022) (per curiam) (granting the applications to stay the
challenged rule of the Occupational Safety & Health Administration mandating that employers
with at least 100 employees require covered workers to receive a COVID–19 vaccine, unless
workers wear a mask each workday and obtain a medical test each week); West Virginia v. EPA,
142 S. Ct. 2584, 2615–16 (2022) (holding that in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, Congress did
not grant the Environmental Protection Agency the authority to devise emissions caps based on
the generation-shifting approach that the Agency took in the Obama administration’s Clean
Power Plan).
74. Klarman, Foreword, supra note 7, at 224–31.
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Biden Commission.75 Similarly, Professor Mark Tushnet, another
academic proponent of Court-packing,76 has long been hostile both to
judicial review77 and to the idea that “law” meaningfully constrains
interpretive discretion.78 At least some skeptics of judicial review who
advocate Court-packing appear to understand the risk that packing the
Court would damage its legitimacy and functioning, and for some of
them, this risk seems to count as a benefit of packing it.79 Their views
about the effects of Court-packing conflict with, and are likely more
accurate than, the views of advocates of Court-packing who argue that
packing the Court would restore its legitimacy by increasing its
ideological balance or by depoliticizing it.80
II. COURT-PACKING HAS LIKELY BEEN PROHIBITED BY A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
This Part argues that Court-packing is likely prohibited by an
important constitutional norm or convention. This norm matters, even
if violating it does not contravene the Constitution, and even if other
norms are arguably being ignored by politicians, precisely because of

75. Professor Klarman said that judicial review “basically takes nine unelected, elderly
people and says, you go and make abortion policy, you make affirmative action policy, you decide
on school prayer, you decide on campaign finance reform. That’s not a very sensible position and
it doesn’t have much to do with law.” Presidential Comm’n on the Sup. Ct. of the U.S.: Third Public
Meeting 380–82 (July 20, 2021) (statement of Michael Klarman, Charles Warren Professor of L.
Hist., Harvard L. Sch.), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/TranscriptPCSCOTUS-07-20-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HDJ-4ZFN].
76. See TUSHNET, TAKING BACK THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 214–22 (appearing
to suggest that Court-packing is constitutional, would not violate a constitutional convention, and
would likely not further erode the Court’s legitimacy, which progressives should not try to
preserve anyway).
77. For his most famous book on this subject, see generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999), arguing for a “populist” constitutional law
according to which the People, rather than the judiciary, have the ultimate say over the
Constitution’s meaning.
78. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 819 & n.119 (1983) (writing that “in any interesting
case any reasonably skilled lawyer can reach whatever result he or she wants” and “the claim
holds even if an ‘interesting’ case is defined as one that some lawyer finds worthwhile to pursue”).
79. See, e.g., TUSHNET, TAKING BACK THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 221–22
(advising progressives to “think about what they lose from preserving the Court’s legitimacy,”
because “[t]he conservative Court has already ruled in favor of such oppressed minorities as Big
Pharma, and against minorities such as Muslims and African Americans,” and “[t]he idea that on
balance a conservative Court will promote progressive goals seems wildly mistaken”).
80. See, e.g., supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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the structural dangers described in Part I. After offering evidence for a
convention against Court-packing, this Part explains why such a norm
is consistent with even ideologically aggressive uses of the
appointments process. It concludes by expressing some uncertainty
about the current status of the convention against Court-packing given
the increasing politicization of the Supreme Court confirmation
process.
A. The Constitutional Convention Against Court-Packing
The constitutional text and historical practice recognize the link
between judicial efficacy and judicial legitimacy and between judicial
legitimacy and judicial independence. Article III requires the existence
of “one supreme Court”; it does not leave the matter to Congress’s
discretion, as it does for other federal courts.81 The text also provides
salary protection for federal judges and job security in the form of
guaranteed service during “good Behaviour.”82 Alexander Hamilton
wrote in Federalist 78 that “nothing can contribute so much to [the
federal judiciary’s] firmness and independence as permanency in
office,”83 and Article III’s “good Behaviour” language has also been
glossed by historical practice to mean life tenure absent impeachment
and conviction, which cannot be used just because of disagreement
with a judge’s decisions.84 No Justice has ever been impeached and
convicted, and no federal judge has ever been impeached and
convicted based upon disagreements with their decisions.85 In addition,
although partisan considerations did inform occasional changes in the
size of the Court up until 1869, good-government reasons did as well,86
and Congress has not since changed the size of the Court,
notwithstanding vehement disagreements with many of its decisions.
81. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
82. Id.
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
84. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. For discussion of the role of historical practice in informing
beliefs about the proper bases for removing federal judges, see Bradley & Siegel, Judicial
Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 319–20.
85. See List of Individuals Impeached by the House of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Impeachme
nt/Impeachment-List/ [https://perma.cc/U26U-8GU3] (cataloguing impeachments and charges by
the House of Representatives).
86. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the early historical practice); infra
notes 139–146 and accompanying text (same); Bradley & Siegel, Judicial Separation of Powers,
supra note 5, at 271–73 (same).
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One hundred fifty years of customary political branch practice,
including (as discussed below) an explicit rejection by Congress (and
the public) of FDR’s Court-packing effort in 1937, should not be
casually dismissed.
Having studied the historical practice regarding issues of judicial
legitimacy, independence, and power, a number of constitutional law
and federal courts scholars have suggested that there exists a
“constitutional convention” (also called a “constitutional norm”)
against Court-packing.87 Constitutional conventions are “maxims,
beliefs, and principles that guide officials in how they exercise political
discretion.”88 Constitutional conventions are not required by the letter
of the U.S. Constitution, but they impose obligations of compliance on
government officials, and they are appropriately denominated
“constitutional” because they help vindicate “the spirit”—or the
purposes—of the Constitution.89 Violating a constitutional convention
without a sufficient justification is not unconstitutional, but it “is
anticonstitutional.”90 Conventions, among other things, help preserve
democracy, enable legislatures to function, constrain the growth of

87. See, e.g., Bradley & Siegel, Judicial Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 274–83;
Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional Rule of
Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 69, 78–79 (Matthew
D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009); Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of
Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 505 (2018); Vicki C. Jackson, Laurence H. Tribe
Professor of Const. L., Harvard L. Sch., Submission, before the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 20 (July 20, 2021), https://www.white
house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Jackson-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/A34U-SQ28];
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and the Plural Judiciary: On the Potential
Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021, 1063–64 (2014); David
E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 15 n.50, 34, 69 (2014); see infra
note 113 and accompanying text (quoting most of the foregoing scholars). Political scientists
Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have similarly argued that a norm of institutional forbearance
prohibits Court-packing. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 59, at 130–33; cf. Richard Primus,
Rulebooks, Playgrounds, and Endgames: A Constitutional Analysis of the Calabresi-Hirji
Judgeship Proposal, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Nov. 24, 2017), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/
rulebooks-playgrounds-and-endgames-a-constitutional-analysis-of-the-calabresi-hirji-judgeshipproposal [https://perma.cc/GAJ9-956M] (concluding that a proposal to pack the lower federal
courts with Republican appointees “threatens the permanent unraveling of a settlement that has
made legitimate judicial review possible for a century and a half” and “departs from long-settled
norms and understandings about how American government is conducted”).
88. Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United
States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1860.
89. Id. at 1852.
90. Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald
Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177, 182 (2018).
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executive power, prevent the politicization of federal criminal law
enforcement, and protect judicial legitimacy and independence.91
In calling attention to a potential convention against Courtpacking, scholars have pointed to a variety of evidence, including the
reasons that the Senate Judiciary Committee offered in 1937 in
opposing FDR’s Court-packing plan. Seven of the ten members of this
committee were prominent Democrats.92 Like a number of the
witnesses who appeared before it,93 the Committee tacked back and
forth between the language of constitutional conventions and the
language of constitutional law, appearing to argue that FDR’s plan was
both an anticonstitutional and an unconstitutional attack on judicial
independence. The report declared that the plan was “contrary to the
spirit of the Constitution” and that “[u]nder the form of the
Constitution it seeks to do that which is unconstitutional.”94 The
Committee expanded upon the “constitutional impropriety” of the bill
by describing how the U.S. constitutional system functions, and is
supposed to function, in practice:
For the protection of the people, for the preservation of the rights of
the individual, for the maintenance of the liberties of minorities, for
maintaining the checks and balances of our dual system, the three
branches of the Government were so constituted that the
independent expression of honest difference of opinion could never
be restrained in the people’s servants and no one branch could
overawe or subjugate the others. That is the American system.95

The Committee concluded that “[c]onstitutionally, the bill can have no
sanction.”96 It “[was] in violation of the organic law.”97
Other progressive Democrats shared FDR’s objective of enlarging
the Court but opined that amending the Constitution was the
constitutionally appropriate means of achieving it.98 This process
91.
92.

For discussion of these conventions, see generally id.
See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 146 (1996).
93. See, e.g., infra note 99 and accompanying text (quoting Erwin Griswold).
94. S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 9, 23 (1937).
95. Id. at 8.
96. Id. at 9.
97. Id.
98. MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL
WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 303–04 (2002) (quoting letters to Congress
making this point); see also Reorganization of the Fed. Judiciary: Hearings Before the Comm. on
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concern seems difficult to dismiss as mere politics. Also hard to
disregard as ordinary politics is Erwin Griswold’s testimony: “Despite
the assertion that the bill raises no constitutional problem, it is obvious
that it presents the deepest sort of constitutional issue, an issue of a
system of government. Our system would in fact be changed if this bill
goes through.”99 This point was perhaps put best by an elderly woman,
who complained that “[i]f nine judges were enough for George
Washington, they should be enough for President Roosevelt.”100 To
correct her account of history is to miss the deeper point she was
conveying.101 Indeed, in some ways, the historical inaccuracy of her
remark makes it even stronger.
Professor Richard Pildes has pointed out two aspects of the 1937
episode that are not widely appreciated today. First, “the Court’s
challenge to the political branches was far more breathtaking than
many recall.”102 It was substantially more sweeping than anything the

the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 719–20 (1937) [hereinafter 1937 Hearings] (testimony of Young B.
Smith, Dean, Columbia Law School) (arguing that the only proper way to address the Court’s
resistance to the New Deal was to “submit[] the question to the people” through a proposed
constitutional amendment); S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 7, 10 (1937) (emphasizing that amendment is
“the course defined by the framers of the Constitution” and “the rule laid down by the
Constitution itself”).
99. 1937 Hearings, supra note 98, at 767 (testimony of Erwin Griswold, Professor, Harvard
Law School).
100. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 92, at 139.
101. FDR himself understood that Court-packing violated a “taboo.” See id. at 118–19
(“Both the Attorney General and the President had been attracted to ‘Court-packing’ for a long
time, but they recognized that the proposition violated a taboo and that some principle would
have to be found to legitimate it.”); JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS 29
(1938) (“[FDR and his Attorney General] realized that [Court-packing] offended against what
they privately called a ‘taboo,’ but they believed that the taboo had been greatly weakened by the
Court’s own behavior.”).
102. Pildes, supra note 36, at 129. Professor Pildes details the carnage:
We are all aware of the major highlights—the Court’s invalidation of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA). But
consider the range of national and state legislation and presidential action the Court
held unconstitutional in one seventeen-month period starting in January 1935: the
NIRA, both its Codes of Fair Competition and the President’s power to control the
flow of contraband oil across state lines; the Railroad Retirement Act; the FrazierLemke Farm Mortgage Moratorium Act; the effort of the President to get the
administrative agencies to reflect his political vision (Humphrey’s Executor); the Home
Owners’ Loan Act; a federal tax on liquor dealers; the AAA; the new SEC’s attempts
to subpoena records to enforce the securities laws; the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act; the Municipal Bankruptcy Act, which Congress passed to enable local
governments to use the bankruptcy process; and, perhaps most dramatically, in
Morehead v Tipaldo, minimum-wage laws on the books in a third of the states, in some
cases, for decades.
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current Supreme Court has done to date. Second, “here was the most
popular president in history, with a Congress his party controlled
overwhelmingly, confronted by the most aggressive Court in American
history,” yet “FDR’s legislative assault on the Court destroyed his
political coalition, in Congress and nationally, and ended his ability to
enact major domestic policy legislation, despite his huge electoral
triumph in 1936.”103 These causes and effects of FDR’s Court-packing
plan speak to “how deep the cultural and political support was for the
Court’s institutional authority, even as the Court issued one unpopular
decision after another.”104
Since 1937, there has often been intense displeasure with the
Supreme Court for various decisions or lines of decisions. Even so, in
the decades following the failure of FDR’s plan, no serious talk of
Court-packing—or bills that would expand the size of the Court—were
proposed by members of Congress or by presidents.105 On the contrary,
the very term “Court-packing” became an epithet that both parties
used to express their condemnation of FDR’s plan and the great value
they placed on judicial independence.106 For example, when various
jurisdiction-stripping measures were proposed in Congress in the late
1950s or debated within the executive branch in the early 1980s, the
negative precedent of 1937 was cited in response.107 This history seems
to suggest that Court-packing has not been a matter of ordinary
substantive disagreements in U.S. politics. Court-packing also appears
to have been at least anticonstitutional, a violation of a constitutional
convention. Further evidence of the existence of this convention can
Id. at 129–30 (footnotes omitted) (citing Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935) and Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936)); id. at 130 (noting that
“[i]n the summer of 1935, more than 100 district judges held acts of Congress unconstitutional,
issuing more than 1,600 injunctions against New Deal legislation”).
103. Id. at 132.
104. Id.
105. Starting in 1946 and lasting a decade, with FDR’s Court-packing plan plainly in mind,
certain leaders of the American bar campaigned to protect the Court through a constitutional
amendment. Senator John Marshall Butler of Maryland introduced an amendment that would
have frozen the Court’s size at nine, ensured its appellate jurisdiction in all constitutional cases,
and imposed a retirement age of seventy-five on the Justices. For a discussion of this episode,
including of why it is challenging to draw inferences from it regarding the status of a constitutional
norm against Court-packing, see Bradley & Siegel, Judicial Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at
284–87.
106. For discussion, see Grove, supra note 87, at 512–17.
107. For discussion, see Bradley & Siegel, Judicial Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 295–
312.
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be found in the present moment, in which there are politicians,
scholars, lawyers, and public commentators who continue to oppose
Court-packing even as they condemn both the recent conduct of
Senate Republicans regarding Supreme Court nominations and the
ideological assertiveness of the Roberts Court in key areas of
constitutional law.108
This Part uses qualifications such as “likely” and “appears to” in
describing the existence of a constitutional convention against Courtpacking, not only because it has not exhaustively examined all of the
relevant historical practice, but also—and more importantly—because
“[t]here is no precise metric for knowing what constitutes qualifying
practice or how long it must be followed in order to be credited.”109
Moreover, there are “inevitably questions about the proper level of
generality at which to describe the past practice.”110 Relatedly, some of
the asserted reasons for packing the Court now “are specific to our
time” and so may fall outside the scope of any relevant constitutional
convention.111 Part IV identifies extraordinary circumstances in which
Court-packing would be beyond the scope of the likely, longstanding
convention against it and would be justified. All of that said, the
historical practice, especially since 1869, best supports the view of
scholars who have stated that Court-packing, at least under almost all
imaginable circumstances, violates a constitutional convention
protecting the perception and reality of judicial independence.112 As
Professor Michael Dorf wrote in 2009, constitutionality aside, we “have
very good reasons to think that Court packing is something that
Congress and the President just cannot do.”113 The best evidence of a

108. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Court-Packing Is Not the Answer to This Problem, WASH. POST
(Dec. 17, 2021, 4:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/12/17/marcus-supremecourt-packing-not-the-answer [https://perma.cc/VU79-ZKXF].
109. Bradley & Siegel, Judicial Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 262.
110. Id.
111. BIDEN COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 73.
112. See supra note 87 (citing these scholars).
113. Dorf, supra note 87, at 74 (emphasis in original); see Grove, supra note 87 (“There is a
strong norm today against ‘packing’ the Supreme Court—that is, modifying the Court’s size in
order to alter the future course of its decisions.”); Jackson, supra note 87 (“A strong norm has
developed that the political branches do not threaten or change the Court’s membership because
of unhappiness with its decisions.”); Krotoszynski, supra note 87 (observing that “[C]ourt packing
is essentially considered a wholly illegitimate means of seeking to alter existing Supreme Court
doctrine”); Pozen, supra note 87, at 34 (noting that “‘Court packing’ is especially out of bounds”
and that “[t]his is part of the convention of judicial independence”).
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normative practice exists where a deviation is proposed or attempted
and is defeated on grounds of impropriety. Such evidence does not
always exist, but it does for Court-packing, and—as noted just above—
there is evidence of its existence today, not just in 1937.
B. Court-Packing versus Court-Appointing
One objection to the conclusion that Court-packing violates a
constitutional convention is that it proves too much by also
condemning ideologically aggressive uses of the regular appointments
process, which can be called “Court-appointing.” During his long time
in office, FDR was able to appoint eight Justices, all committed New
Dealers, using this process.114 It may reasonably be asked why this sort
of ideological influence on the Court does not violate a constitutional
convention akin to the one invoked in 1937. This is a deeply interesting
question, and there are at least three answers to it. First, unlike the
direct control over the Court entailed by changing the number of
Justices, Congress and the president do not control when a vacancy
occurs. As a result, the regular appointments process compromises the
perception and reality of judicial independence to a lesser extent than
does Court-packing. Court-packing confers control over not just the
selection of the Court’s personnel but also the occasion for selecting
them.
Second, there are virtues to potentially slowing down the process
through which politicians affect the ideological orientation of the
Court. Requiring one appointment at a time increases the likelihood
(although it does not guarantee) that a political party will need to win
multiple elections to make several appointments.115 Increasing this
likelihood in turn increases the chances that a party making several
appointments has earned the democratic authority to do so. There may
not be a difference in this regard between a one-term president who
appoints two Justices through the regular appointments process and
one who does so through a Court-packing plan. But a one-term
president will almost never be able to appoint four or six Justices
through the regular appointments process; they can always do so

114. Bradley & Siegel, Judicial Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 283 n.163.
115. Cf. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1082 (2001) (emphasizing that “cumulative acts of partisan entrenchment”
in the courts, through judicial appointments, can produce “constitutional change . . . quickly or
slowly, depending on how the forces of politics operate”).
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through a Court-packing plan.116 In sum, relative to Court-packing, the
regular appointments process impacts the perception and reality of
judicial independence less significantly and better justifies the impact
on democratic grounds.
These two explanations, which identify differences in fact between
Court-packing and the use of the regular appointments process, help
account for the third, ultimate difference between the two.
Constitutional conventions that limit and structure partisan influence
upon the Court do so to protect judicial legitimacy. Assessments of
judicial legitimacy are, in turn, ultimately based on what people
believe, not on theories of what they should believe. And most
Americans—presidents, members of Congress, lawyers, and
nonlawyers alike—have long believed that Court-packing is different
from, and more threatening to, judicial legitimacy and independence
than even ideologically aggressive uses of the regular appointments
process. As a sociopolitical matter, adding four or six Justices in a day
is likely to be viewed as outside what is normal and appropriate; it is
likely to be regarded as aberrant and disturbing, including by many
Americans who want the ideological orientation of the Court to
change.117 These beliefs are not set in stone; the Court is certainly
capable of changing them by issuing a series of extreme decisions, as
Part IV discusses. But Court-packing has generally been viewed as out
of bounds for a long time now—evidenced, among other things, by the
absence of much Court-packing talk in public discourse until
recently.118
To be sure, one cannot predict with certainty how Americans
would respond if Court-packing actually occurred. But it is risky—it
threatens the system—to roll the dice and find out. If the Court were
to be packed, and if its legitimacy were to become significantly

116. Remarkably, President William Howard Taft—himself a future Chief Justice—
appointed six Justices in one term. Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://
www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/3U99-ULV2].
117. See, e.g., Sen, supra note 47, at 7–8 (reporting that “simply expanding the size of the
Supreme Court is unpopular among the public” and noting polls indicating fewer than one-third
of Americans support increasing the size of the Court); see also TUSHNET, TAKING BACK THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 217–18 (acknowledging that “[s]urveys do suggest that the public
is nervous about changing the Court’s size for political reasons, though not for good-government
ones,” and candidly observing that “[t]he difficulty for Democrats is that they can’t really come
up with decent good-government reasons for adding two justices to the Supreme Court”).
Professor Tushnet wrote these words before Justice Ginsburg’s passing, when the addition of two
Democratic appointees would have created a Democratic-appointed majority on the Court.
118. BIDEN COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 73, 80–81.
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impaired as a result, the political party responsible, and its enablers,
would not be able to fairly say that they were not warned—that they
could not have reasonably perceived the risk. They are currently being
warned about the risk. Moreover, it is unpersuasive to suggest that
there are equally substantial risks associated with not packing the
Court. There presently appears to exist a considerable risk that a very
conservative Court will render some very conservative decisions for a
decade or more, but few people believe that this by itself justifies
Court-packing any more than if a very liberal Court were to render
some very liberal decisions for a decade or more. As Parts IV and V
argue, if the current Court were to imperil its own legitimacy or cause
(or deepen) a national crisis, Court-packing would be on the table. One
need not be highly risk-averse to believe that uncertainty favors the
status quo when one is deciding whether to change the longstanding
structure of the head of an entire branch of government.
Whether there remains a constitutional convention against Courtpacking is somewhat uncertain in light of the increasing politicization
of the Supreme Court confirmation process. Constitutional
conventions require bipartisan support, so if one political party no
longer feels bound by the convention against Court-packing, then it no
longer exists. Although the Democrats’ hands have not been clean on
the subject of judicial appointments, so far, at least, the convention
against Court-packing is surviving unified Democratic government.
But given the conduct of Senate Republicans in recent years that is
examined in Part V, as well as the threats some Republican senators
made to leave seats on the Court open for four years if Democratic
candidate Hillary Clinton were elected in 2016,119 one cannot say with
complete confidence that a Republican president and Congress would
respect the convention if they were persistently unhappy with the
Court’s decisions. Part V, however, offers reasons why it might harm
the Republicans if they were to pack, and thereby degrade, the Court.
The prospect of such self-inflicted harm might well dissuade them from
packing the Court even if they felt the need and had the power to do
it.

119. See, e.g., LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 59, at 166 (“[W]hen it was widely believed
that Hillary Clinton would win, several Republican senators, including Ted Cruz, John McCain,
and Richard Burr, vowed to block all of Clinton’s Supreme Court nominations for the next four
years, effectively reducing the Court’s size to eight.”).
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III. THE UNCERTAIN CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COURT-PACKING
If there is no longer a constitutional convention against Courtpacking that protects judicial independence, or if the convention is
likely to be ignored or violated, then much turns on whether Courtpacking is constitutional. This Part therefore considers the
constitutionality of Court-packing, which would need to take the form
of a federal statute adding seats to the Court.120 The dominant view is
that such a statute would be clearly and obviously constitutional.121 This
Part explains why the arguments in favor of the constitutionality of
Court-packing have force, but it disagrees that the question is easily
disposed of. There are arguments against the constitutionality of
Court-packing that warrant serious consideration, even if these
arguments may ultimately be too vulnerable to carry the day. Still, the
question of constitutionality is close enough that it cautions against the
use of Court-packing except in extreme situations.
A. Arguments in Favor of the Constitutionality of Court-Packing
Article III requires the existence of “one supreme Court” and
grants it “[t]he judicial Power of the United States,” but Article III
does not specify its size.122 The Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes
Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.”123 Under a straightforward reading of the Necessary
and Proper Clause as interpreted by the Court since McCulloch v.

120. In principle, a constitutional amendment is another possibility. In practice, however, an
amendment would almost certainly prove impossible as long as the Court retained at least some
support, because Article V makes it extraordinarily difficult to amend the Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. V.
121. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 354–55 (2012) (contending that Congress has the
authority to change the size of the Court not only if it has “a sincere good-government reason for
altering the Court’s size,” but “[e]ven if, in a given instance of resizing the Court, Congress was
retaliating against what it perceived as Court abuses—say, a string of dubious rulings and judicial
overreaches”); Dorf, supra note 87, at 79 (“If, say, Congress were to increase the size of the
Supreme Court to eleven Justices, neither the Court itself, nor any member of Congress, could
plausibly claim that in so doing it was acting unconstitutionally.”); see also BIDEN COMM’N
REPORT, supra note 5, at 98 n.70 (“Most scholars who have considered the issue . . . have
concluded that Congress has broad power to modify the Court’s size.”).
122. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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Maryland,124 Congress can set the size of the Court as a necessary (that
is, reasonable) way of carrying the powers of the Court into execution.
After all, the Court cannot function without having a set number of
Justices at a particular time.125 Moreover, setting the size of the Court
is not improper on the ground that it is a “great substantive and
independent power” akin to the powers to tax or regulate interstate
commerce, such that this power would need to be listed separately in
the Constitution for Congress to possess it.126 On the contrary, whether
to have five or ten Justices (the actual historical range to date) would
seem to be exactly the sort of discretionary judgment that falls within
the implied powers of Congress; the decision is part of “that vast mass
of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution.”127
Finally, Congress’s motive in using the Necessary and Proper Clause
has not been thought to matter in assessing the constitutionality of
legislation passed under this clause,128 just as Congress’s motive has not
been thought to matter when Congress exercises its other powers
under Article I, Section 8.129
In addition, it is not clear that Congress must rely on the Necessary
and Proper Clause to set the size of the Court. To repeat, the first
section of Article III sets forth a constitutional requirement that there
exist “one supreme Court.”130 If the Necessary and Proper Clause had
been left out of the Constitution, Congress would still be under a
constitutional obligation—it would still possess the nondiscretionary
124. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133–34 (2010) (“[T]he Necessary and
Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative authority
are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to
the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’” (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413, 418)).
126. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 559–61 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.) (concluding that a requirement to buy health insurance was a great substantive and
independent power akin to taxing or declaring war and thus was beyond the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause).
127. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010) (“We have since made
clear that, in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the
legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute
constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally
enumerated power.” (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) and Gonzales v.
Raich, 541 U.S. 1, 22 (2005))).
129. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (“The motive and purpose of a
regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of
which the Constitution places no restriction, and over which the courts are given no control.”).
130. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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power—to establish the Court. Moreover, Congress has, for good
reason, apparently never believed that it can establish the Court
without setting the number of Justices who will serve on it.131 And
because Congress set the number of Justices initially, it is not clear why
a distinct source of congressional power is required to change the size
of the Court subsequently. Again, if there were no Necessary and
Proper Clause, it would be implausible to argue that the size of the
Court was set in constitutional stone in 1789—when Congress passed
the first Judiciary Act—no matter how sensible on good-government
grounds it might later become to change the Court’s size in response to
profound changes in the country. The Biden Commission Report did
not consider this structural argument.132
Furthermore, the Appointments Clause,133 the Exceptions
Clause,134 and the clause subjecting “all civil Officers” to removal via
impeachment and conviction135 all indicate that the Constitution
empowers the political branches to ensure judicial accountability; it
does not just provide for judicial legitimacy and independence. Courtpacking is a highly potent method of ensuring judicial accountability.
This instrument contradicts nothing in the constitutional text unless
one reads a great deal into the under-determinate semantic meaning of
the word “proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause,136 which

131. Perhaps Congress could establish the Court without setting the number of Justices. If
Congress did not fix the Court’s size by statute, perhaps each president would be free to nominate
as many Justices as that president wanted, and perhaps the Senate would be free to confirm or
deny confirmation to as many nominees as the Senate wanted. Cf. James Durling & E. Garrett
West, Appointments Without Law, 105 VA. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (2019) (arguing that the president
has the authority to appoint both diplomats and Supreme Court Justices without congressional
authorization). The historical practice is, however, uniformly to the contrary. This is fortunate: a
Court with a floating size would risk becoming the plaything of the political parties whenever one
party controlled both the White House and the Senate.
132. See BIDEN COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 73–74 (analyzing the legality of Court
expansion).
133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
134. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
135. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The argument that the term “proper” is a significant
limitation on the scope of the power granted in the Necessary and Proper Clause had skeptics in
the Founding era. See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL 7 (1999) (quoting the view of the first Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, that both
the friends and the enemies to the first bank bill ought to regard the term “proper” in the
Necessary and Proper Clause “as among the surplusage which as often proceeds from inattention
as caution”); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 418–19 (1819) (arguing that the meaning of
the word “proper” has a qualifying effect on the meaning of the word “necessary”).
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(notwithstanding the above structural argument) is typically viewed as
the only source of legislative authority to change the size of the Court.
Moreover, when the Constitution does protect judicial legitimacy and
independence, it arguably says so. Specifically, the tenure and salary
protections of Article III are designed to insulate the Justices from
partisan politics.137 These textual protections may suggest some caution
in reading other unspecified protections of the Court into the
Constitution.
Turning from the constitutional text to the constitutional
structure, the Constitution establishes not only a system of separation
of powers but also a system of checks and balances. Judicial legitimacy
and independence are not absolute constitutional values in the U.S.
system any more than judicial accountability is. Court-packing can be
viewed as a constitutionally permissible check against a branch that has
far exceeded the limits of its own authority in the eyes of the nation as
represented in the political branches. To be sure, Court-packing holds
the potential to severely compromise the legitimacy and independence
of the Supreme Court.138 As the next Part demonstrates, however,
Court-packing also holds the potential to restore the Court’s legitimacy
when it has been damaged by a political party or by the Justices
themselves, and packing can help the nation respond effectively to a
national crisis partially of the Court’s own making. Perhaps the
Constitution should not be interpreted as always choosing one set of
concerns over the other.
At least some of the early historical practice—which likely
involved instances of Court-packing or unpacking—supports these
textual and structural arguments. For example, in 1801, the lame-duck
Federalist Congress provided via statute that, upon the next vacancy
on the Court, its membership would be reduced from the original six
seats to five, apparently to deny incoming President Thomas Jefferson
an appointment.139 A year later, and before there was a vacancy, the
Democratic-Republicans restored the size of the Court to six seats.140
The fact that the Federalists’ act of Court-unpacking was speedily
undone by the Jeffersonians does not necessarily mean, as one scholar

137. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 465 (Alexander
Hamilton).
138. See supra Part I.
139. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89, 89.
140. See Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
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has suggested,141 that it does not “count” as an instance of Courtpacking in an assessment of the historical practice. It seems
straightforward to suggest that the Federalists passed an unpacking
statute and the Jeffersonians responded proportionally by enacting a
law that restored the original number of seats. In any event, two other
instances of changing the Court’s size arguably to affect its decisionmaking were not undone by the political opposition. When President
Abraham Lincoln was assassinated and Vice President Andrew
Johnson became president, the Republicans reduced the size of the
Court from ten seats to seven, possibly to deny Johnson
appointments—the motive has been disputed.142 In 1869, however,
after Ulysses S. Grant was elected president, the Republicans increased
the size of the Court to nine—where it has remained ever since.143
Examining the early history, the Biden Commission Report
concludes that “[e]ach reform seems to have been motivated by a mix
of institutional and political concerns.”144 Although the Report is wise
to caution against casually concluding that it is always easy to
distinguish Court-packing from good-government reasons for Court
expansion, the Report’s formulation risks unduly blurring the
distinction between the two. For example, the Report acknowledges
that the 1801 “reduction in size was also likely attributable to the
Federalists’ desire to prevent their incoming political rival—Presidentelect Thomas Jefferson—from filling a Supreme Court vacancy,” but it
suggests that “[i]n 1801, the Federalist Congress temporarily ended
circuit riding, and so its reduction of the Court to five Justices could
have been justified by the fact that the Court could now function
effectively with only five members.”145 The Report cites no authority

141. See Joshua Braver, Court-Packing: An American Tradition?, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2747, 2751
(2020) (“President John Adams and the Federalists’ 1801 efforts to block President-elect Thomas
Jefferson’s future Supreme Court appointment ultimately failed and serves as no type of
precedent.”). Professor Braver appears correct, however, that Court-packing was rarer in early
American history than the conventional view maintains. See generally id. (recounting the history
of changes to the size of the Supreme Court).
142. Compare ORTH, supra note 4, at 6 (arguing that the reduction was designed to deny
Johnson appointments), with Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864–1888: Part
One, in VI THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 166–70 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971) (documenting that Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase had recommended the reduction to persuade Congress to increase the Justices’ salaries).
143. See Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1).
144. BIDEN COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 68.
145. Id.
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for this good-government interpretation of what the Federalist
Congress was seeking to accomplish, nor does it seem plausible given
all of the other partisan shenanigans in which the Federalists were
engaged during the transition from the Adams administration to the
Jefferson administration.146
Some of the modern practice also supports the conclusion that
Court-packing is constitutional. Most importantly, FDR’s Justice
Department
concluded
that
Court-packing
was
clearly
147
constitutional, and FDR’s plan was defeated—in part—for political
reasons, which were present alongside claims about constitutional law
and conventions.148 The historical practice may be too debatable to
provide a basis for the imposition of constitutional limits on Courtpacking. Moreover, as the next Part discusses, it is questionable as a
prudential matter to infer that the Constitution prohibits Courtpacking no matter what life-tenured Justices do with the enormous
power they have exercised since at least the late nineteenth century.
B. Arguments Against the Constitutionality of Court-Packing
So, the conventional view that Court-packing is constitutionally
permissible has force. Still, there is more to be said than has been said
to date. One could go farther than the argument developed in the
previous Part by suggesting that Court-packing is not only
anticonstitutional—that is, violative of a constitutional convention—
but also unconstitutional. Again, few commentators would take this

146. For discussion of these shenanigans, which included expanding federal jurisdiction and
staffing all sixteen of the new circuit judgeships with Federalists, see DANIEL A. FARBER & NEIL
S. SIEGEL, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17–20 (2019). The first national political
transition under the Constitution—from the hitherto dominant Federalists to the ascendant
Democratic-Republicans—was rocky in part because the Founders lacked many of the
constitutional norms that manage (or are supposed to manage) political transitions today. And so
when one side created judgeships at the last minute, the other side terminated them in likely
contravention of Article III and canceled a Supreme Court term to postpone judicial resolution
of the matter. For discussion of the crisis of 1800–1803, see generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE
FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005).
147. See, e.g., Memorandum from Warner W. Gardner, Dep’t of Just., to the Solic. Gen. 55,
57 (Dec. 10, 1936) (stating that, of the ways of combatting the Court’s invalidations of New Deal
legislation—including jurisdiction stripping, which was rejected as constitutionally too
problematic—Court-packing was “the only [option that] is certainly constitutional” because
“Congress has on numerous occasions changed the membership of the Court”).
148. Bradley & Siegel, Judicial Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 283 (documenting those
political reasons).
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claim seriously, but it is worth considering whether the provisions of
Article III protecting judicial legitimacy and independence, combined
with the potential for Court-packing to devastate the Court as an
institution and 150 years of stability in the Court’s composition, might
support a structural inference that Court-packing violates the
Constitution.149
With respect to the constitutional text, life tenure and the
associated protection against salary reductions (but not cost-of-living
increases) distinguishes the Justices from all other high-ranking
government officials in the constitutional scheme.150 As the previous
Section notes, one could infer that these are the only protections for
judicial legitimacy and independence that the Constitution provides,
but one could also plausibly infer that the political branches may not
permissibly act against the Court in ways that significantly undermine
the purpose of giving the Justices life tenure and salary protection in
the first place. This purpose is to enable the Justices to stand apart from
partisan politics—and to be perceived as standing apart—so that they
can perform functions that partisan institutions are unlikely to perform
as well. For the reasons offered in Part I, Court-packing is highly likely
to erode judicial legitimacy and the perception and reality of judicial
independence.
With respect to the constitutional structure, if Court-packing were
likely to severely damage or destroy the very institution whose
existence the Constitution compels,151 then there is a reasonable
structural argument against it. Consider the emphasis of the 1937
Senate Judiciary Committee on how the constitutional system is
supposed to function.152 On this view, Court-packing severely

149. Curtis Bradley and this Author have argued that, to appropriately credit historical
practice in constitutional interpretation, three requirements must be met: (1) governmental
practice, (2) longstanding duration, and (3) acquiescence, which requires at least reasonable
stability in the practice. The third requirement demands that the practice have existed for a
significant number of years without producing continued inter-branch contestation, but it does
not necessarily demand inter-branch constitutional agreement. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel,
Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate, 106 VA. L. REV. 1, 17–31
(2020).
150. For example, the president serves a four-year term, may not receive pay raises while in
office, and can be re-elected only once. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 1 & cl. 7; id. amend. XXII, § 1.
151. See id. art. III, § 1.
152. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (quoting the report of the Senate Judiciary
Committee); cf. BALKIN, supra note 22, at 142 (observing that structural arguments and principles
“explain how the Constitution works in practice and how it should work”).
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compromises judicial legitimacy and independence—it significantly
undermines the constitutional structure and therefore violates the
separation of powers. There is at least some force to the argument that
the power of Congress to set the size of the Court should not be
interpreted as the power to severely damage or destroy it.153 Severe
damage or destruction would not take the form of a Court building that
no longer exists or Justices who no longer have jobs. Rather, as
explained, it would take the form of a significant threat or reality of
defiance of Supreme Court decisions or refusals by the executive to
enforce them.
If one rejects structural reasoning and insists on finding a textual
provision that Court-packing would violate, one could invoke
Professor Randy Barnett’s argument against the constitutionality of
Court-packing, which he conveyed in his testimony before the Biden
Commission.154 He maintains that Court-packing is not “proper”
within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause because it
undermines the separation of powers and the independence of the
judiciary.155 Professor Michael Rappaport previously developed a
version of this argument, although he expressed uncertainty about
whether it is correct.156 It is not clear, however, that anything of
substance turns on whether one houses what is ultimately structural
reasoning in the text of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
With respect to the historical practice, the early practice contained
at most only a small number of relatively clear instances of Courtpacking, as the discussion in the previous Section suggests. As for the
modern practice, some objections to Court-packing in 1937 appeared
to use the language of both law and conventions. “What may be most
significant about objections to FDR’s Court-packing plan is their
ambiguity,” Professor Curtis Bradley and this Author have observed.
“Reading the Senate Hearing Transcript and Report, it is not always

153. Cf. generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects
Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012) (arguing that Congress’s power to tax is not
the power to destroy assessed conduct).
154. See Randy E. Barnett, Patrick Hotung Professor of Const. L., Georgetown Univ. L. Ctr.,
Written Statement, before the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, at 2 (July 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/
Barnett-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/24PS-7JKK].
155. Id. at 9–10.
156. Michael Rappaport, Is Court Packing Unconstitutional?, LAW & LIBERTY (Nov. 6,
2020), https://lawliberty.org/is-court-packing-constitutional [https://perma.cc/3FF7-PWF3].
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clear whether the objection was that Court-packing would be
normatively improper but legally permissible, or would be normatively
improper and legally impermissible. References to the ‘spirit’ of the
Constitution were at times similarly ambiguous.”157 If the historical
practice is too debatable to provide a basis for the imposition of
constitutional limits on Court-packing, it is also more debatable than
many advocates of Court-packing may want to acknowledge.
Finally, the consensus that Court-packing presents no
constitutional difficulties at all seems questionable given the dissensus
concerning the constitutionality of stripping the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction (“Court-stripping”).158 The constitutional arguments
against Court-stripping do not appear stronger than the constitutional
arguments against Court-packing; indeed, in some ways, the
constitutional arguments against Court-stripping are weaker than
those against Court-packing.159 For example, Court-stripping seems
better justified textually by the relative specificity of the Exceptions
Clause (which has long been understood to permit Congress to make
exceptions to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction160) than Court-packing
seems textually warranted by the relative generality of the Necessary
and Proper Clause.161 Similarly, Ex parte McCardle162 is judicial
precedent that can be invoked to support the constitutionality of
Court-stripping (even if it can be distinguished).163 By contrast, there is
157. Bradley & Siegel, Judicial Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 279.
158. Compare, e.g., BIDEN COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 67 (observing that “there is
widespread agreement among legal scholars that Congress has the constitutional authority to
expand the Court’s size”), with, e.g., id. at 163 (observing that “[d]ebates about the constitutional
limits on Congress’s power to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the lower federal
courts, and the state courts have generated an enormous literature”).
159. For discussion of the academic debates over Court-stripping, see Bradley & Siegel,
Judicial Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 287–92. For discussion of modern debates over
Court-stripping in Congress and the Executive Branch, see id. at 295–311.
160. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that in all cases not falling within the Court’s
original jurisdiction, it shall have appellate jurisdiction “with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make”).
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This is not to say that the Exceptions Clause grants
Congress plenary power to strip the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The textual reference to
“Exceptions” may presuppose a rule that such exceptions may not swallow. See infra note 166 and
accompanying text. The point is not that Court-stripping is constitutionally unproblematic; the
point, rather, is that Court-stripping is not obviously more problematic than Court-packing.
162. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
163. This decision can be read narrowly, especially given the Court’s assumption of
jurisdiction a few months later in Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868). See Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1078 (2010) (writing that
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no judicial precedent even arguably supporting the constitutionality of
Court-packing that needs to be distinguished.
One could respond that Court-packing, unlike Court-stripping,
merely adds Justices to the Court; it does not prevent the Court from
addressing any questions of federal law. This is true, but to put the
comparison that way is to ignore the risk that Court-packing would
trigger politicians’ noncompliance with, and the executive’s
nonenforcement of, Supreme Court decisions—no matter the textual
requirement that the Court exist.164 Given this risk, Court-packing
raises concerns at least as severe as the worry that Court-stripping
would encourage defiance of Supreme Court precedent by state or
federal officials or judges (because they could not be reversed by the
Court).165
It would also be easier for a subsequent Congress to undo the
effects of Court-stripping than of Court-packing; Congress could
simply repeal the statute stripping the Court’s jurisdiction but could
not undo the appointments, which come with life tenure. This
difference might be dismissed as one not of constitutional magnitude,
but the greater entrenchment of Court-packing against ordinary
legislative change may suggest that it poses a greater structural threat
to judicial legitimacy and independence. Notwithstanding the
vulnerability of constitutional arguments against Court-stripping
relative to those against Court-packing, a fair number of
commentators—including some quite famous ones—believe that the
essential functions of the Court in the constitutional scheme provide a
constitutional limit on Court-stripping.166 So did President Ronald
“McCardle would be an easily distinguishable precedent for a Supreme Court that wanted to
distinguish it” because, “[a]s the Court pointedly noted in its decision, the repealer statute left
open an alternative avenue by which the petitioner could seek appellate review”).
164. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
165. See infra notes 176–178 and accompanying text (discussing this concern with Courtstripping).
166. For seminal works, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364–65 (1953),
insisting that the Constitution does not “authoriz[e] exceptions which engulf the rule” of appellate
jurisdiction, and “the exceptions must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme
Court in the constitutional plan,” and Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 201–02 (1960), attempting to render
Hart’s “essential role” idea less indeterminate by articulating the structural standard that
“exceptions” to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction not “negate” the Court’s “essential
constitutional functions of maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of federal law” and
deeming unconstitutional “legislation that precludes Supreme Court review in every case

SIEGEL PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

9/16/2022 11:52 AM

THE TROUBLE WITH COURT-PACKING

117

Reagan’s Attorney General, William French Smith.167 One could argue
that the same conclusion follows for Court-packing.
The foregoing constitutional arguments are distinct from another
emerging argument against the constitutionality of Court-packing.
Professor Randy Barnett contends that changing the size of the Court
for the purpose of affecting its decision-making is an illegitimate
legislative end and so is beyond the scope of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, which he assumes is the only source of congressional power to
set the size of the Court.168 As authority for this proposition, he invokes
the rule of law governing the scope of Congress’s power under this
clause that was laid down in McCulloch v. Maryland: “Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.”169
It does not appear correct, however, that statutes that are
malintentioned (in any set of ways) are beyond the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Among other examples, it was not
thought that Congress was acting unconstitutionally when it passed a
statute with the purpose of affecting the Court’s decision-making by
encouraging sitting Justices to retire through the offer of full pay during

involving a particular subject.” For Professor Ratner’s later formulation of his standard, see
generally Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control
of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1992). For an argument that review by either
the Supreme Court or a lower federal court is required for constitutional (and perhaps other
federal) claims, see generally Lawrence Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on
Congress’s Authority To Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17
(1981).
167. Constitutionality of Legis. Withdrawing Supreme Court Jurisdiction to Consider Cases
Relating to Voluntary Prayer, 6 Op. O.L.C. 13, 14 (1982) (concluding that Congress has some
power under the Exceptions Clause to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
(and has significantly more authority to regulate the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts), but
that Congress may not, “consistent with the Constitution, make ‘exceptions’ to Supreme Court
jurisdiction which would intrude upon the core functions of the Supreme Court as an independent
and equal branch in our system of separation of powers”). For an account of how General Smith
ultimately agreed with the constitutional concerns expressed by Theodore Olson, then-head of
the Office of Legal Counsel, notwithstanding the rejection of Olson’s concerns by another Justice
Department Attorney, a young John Roberts, who was then a special assistant to Smith, see
Bradley & Siegel, Judicial Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 302–11.
168. See Barnett, supra note 154, at 2–8.
169. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis added).
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retirement.170 Marshall’s reference to a “legitimate end” means—and
has long been understood to mean—an enumerated power like the
Taxing Clause171 or the Interstate Commerce Clause,172 not a proper
purpose for using the Necessary and Proper Clause (however such a
purpose is determined).
More generally, Barnett’s argument proves too much insofar as it
is not persuasively limited to the Necessary and Proper Clause. A good
deal of governmental conduct that has long been understood to be
constitutional has been aimed at affecting the Court’s decision-making,
including ideological judicial nominations by presidents; constitutional
hardball by senators in responding to such nominations; and strong
criticisms of the Court—even threats to impeach individual Justices—
by members of the political branches. In terms of the purpose of
government action, there is nothing unique about Court-packing. It is
not clear why an objective to affect the Court’s decision-making should
be of no constitutional significance in all contexts, except that of Courtpacking, when Barnett’s claim is that such an objective is illegitimate
and indeed contrary to the “spirit of the Constitution.”173
Professor Will Baude rejects purpose-based limits on the
Necessary and Proper Clause, but he suggests that not all nonformalists
can readily reject such limits given the belief of some of them in
purpose-based limits on partisan gerrymandering and jurisdiction
stripping.174 At least three responses are appropriate. First, the legal
effect of a purpose inquiry depends upon the constitutional clause or
structural principle at issue. A belief in purpose-based limits on
partisan gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause175 does not

170. FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 36, at 224 (“Seeking to forestall
trouble, Representative Hatton Sumners saw to it that the House quickly passed and Roosevelt
signed a measure ensuring that Supreme Court justices could retire at full pay; the sense was that
some [J]ustices had delayed retirement because they were concerned about what it would mean
financially.”). One could argue that Congress did not have the purpose of trying to affect the
Court’s decision-making because certain Justices already wanted to retire and Congress merely
freed them up to decide for themselves by taking financial constraints off the table. But this seems
like too fine-grained a distinction to matter. If Congress had not wanted the Justices in question
off the Court, it presumably would not have been as likely to give them the financial incentive to
retire.
171. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.
172. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
173. Barnett, supra note 154; see also id. at 8, 9, 13 (making this claim).
174. Baude, Reflections, supra note 14, at 3–6.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
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a fortiori commit one to purpose-based limits on the Necessary and
Proper Clause. For example, state or federal legislation with a racist
purpose obviously violates equal protection principles, but such a
purpose does not obviously render federal legislation beyond the scope
of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Second, even if Court-stripping is unconstitutional because of its
purpose, it does not necessarily follow that Court-packing is
unconstitutional because of its purpose. To the extent that Courtstripping is beyond the scope of the Exceptions Clause because of its
purpose, it is likely a congressional purpose to encourage defiance of
Supreme Court precedent. As Professor Baude acknowledges,176
Professor Richard Fallon has argued that Court-stripping is
unconstitutional if it has the “constitutionally forbidden purpose of
encouraging defiance of applicable Supreme Court precedent.”177 This
is because, Fallon plausibly reasons, “it is almost always reprehensible
for government officials—including judges—to engage in
lawbreaking,” and so “Congress’s power over jurisdiction should not
be interpreted as a license to encourage lawbreaking by either state or
federal officials or by state court judges.”178 Court-packing does not,
however, have this purpose. Rather, as the outset of this Article
explains, it has the purpose of affecting the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking going forward—the same purpose shared by statutes
conferring generous pensions to persuade Justices to retire and by
aggressive uses of the nomination and confirmation powers.
This is a distinction with a relevant difference from a rule-of-law
perspective, even if the practical result is similar to the result of Courtstripping. Much governmental action may have the purpose of trying
to persuade the Court to change its governing precedents. If successful,
such action would have the consequence that previously unlawful
conduct is now lawful (or vice versa). It is another matter entirely for
governmental action to leave Supreme Court precedent unchanged
and to have the purpose of enabling government officials and judges to
contravene this precedent with impunity. To reject this distinction is to

176.
177.
178.

Baude, Reflections, supra note 14, at 6 n.8.
Fallon, supra note 163, at 1083.
Id.
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reject the difference between trying to produce legal change and
getting away with legal violations.179
Third, and alternatively, Court-stripping may be constitutionally
problematic even if one makes no inquiry at all into congressional
purpose. For example, if a Court-stripping statute is objectively likely
to encourage deviations from Supreme Court precedent by lower
federal courts or by state courts, or to otherwise compromise the
essential functions of the Court in the constitutional scheme, then it
may not matter what Congress’s purpose is. An inquiry into the
probable effects of the statute at issue would have the virtue of being
potentially easier to conduct than a purpose inquiry. This is another
possible reason why one can conclude that Court-stripping is
unconstitutional without accepting the proposition that the purpose of
Court-packing renders it unconstitutional.
In sum, one can be concerned about the constitutionality of
partisan gerrymandering and Court-stripping without being committed
to the view that the purpose of Court-packing takes it outside the scope
of the Necessary and Proper Clause. There are more compelling
reasons to worry about the constitutionality of Court-packing.
C. Summary and Implications for the Advisability of Court-Packing
The constitutionality of Court-packing presents more difficult
issues than commonly recognized. On one hand, the arguments in favor
of the conventional view are relatively strong. On the other hand, there
is a reasonable argument that many admired constitutional law
decisions—legal commentators will disagree about which ones—have
had no more to work with than the textual, structural, practice-based,
and analogical arguments brought to bear above in arguing against the
constitutionality
of
Court-packing.
The
dominant
view
notwithstanding, Court-packing is not entirely free from constitutional
difficulty.
Prudential considerations of the highest order also cut both ways.
Understanding the Constitution to categorically prohibit Courtpacking no matter what the Court does, and no matter what the crisis

179. It is possible that Court-packing would result in some short-term defiance of Supreme
Court precedent because violators might be confident that the expanded Court would change the
precedent to validate their behavior. One can readily support Court-packing, however, without
having the purpose of encouraging such defiance. One could just as easily want all individuals and
institutions that are bound by Supreme Court precedent to respect the Court’s decisions until the
Court changes them.
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is, could have such disastrous consequences that constitutional
arguments stronger than the ones mustered here might be required to
compel such a result. At the same time, one reason there is some
uncertainty about the constitutionality of Court-packing is precisely
due to the potentially devastating impact that packing the Court would
have on the institution. Maybe the best legal answer, if one needs to be
given in the abstract, is that Court-packing is probably constitutional:
the text does not ostensibly prohibit it, the historical practice is mixed
and debatable, structural inferences cut in opposite directions, and
prudential considerations do as well. But the fact that there is some
uncertainty about this conclusion provides another reason to be
extraordinarily cautious about packing the Court—to do so only in
extreme situations.
IV. COURT-PACKING IS JUSTIFIED IN EXTREME SITUATIONS
Assuming that Court-packing is ultimately consistent with the
Constitution, this Part identifies three extreme scenarios in which it
would be justified, notwithstanding the arguments offered in Parts I
through III. After identifying these justifications, this Part offers a
framework for considering them that generally advocates the
enactment of legislation protecting the democratic process or
substantive rights before the passage of legislation packing the Court.
Finally, this Part responds to criticisms from opposite directions: that
its framework inadequately considers the costs of delaying or declining
the opportunity to pack the Court, and that it would be better to shut
the door completely on Court-packing than to permit it in
extraordinary circumstances.
A. Three Justifications for Court-Packing
“Never” is a long time. Although Court-packing is almost always
a bad idea that may still violate a constitutional convention, it would
be overstated to say that Court-packing would never be justified, for at
least three reasons. Court-packing could be a proportional response to
a previous instance of unjustified Court-packing or similarly extreme
partisan behavior. Court-packing could also restore the Court’s
legitimacy in the eyes of a large majority of Americans if the Court
were to squander its legitimacy by rendering a series of decisions that
these Americans viewed as extreme and damaging. And packing the
Court might be needed to meet a national crisis to which the Court was
contributing.
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First, packing the Court with n more Justices would be a justified
response to a previous decision of the other political party to pack the
Court with n more Justices if the other party’s prior decision was itself
unjustified under the framework offered in this Section. (If the initial
packing were justified for either of the two reasons offered below, then
the framework would be self-undermining if it justified packing in
response.) Packing the Court proportionally in response to unjustified
Court-packing by the other political party can be called “counterpacking.” For example, counter-packing by a political party would be
justified if the other party were to pack the Court simply to seize
control of it.
Under this first rationale, it is possible that Court-packing would
be justified by partisan conduct other than an initial act of unjustified
packing. For example, if the majority party in the Senate were able to
confirm a nominee only through bribery of wavering senators, then the
other party might be justified in adding up to two Justices at a later
date as the only way to undo the possibly decades-long impact of the
corrupt appointment—to “free the taint,” so to speak.180 Court-packing
would not be justified, however, merely because the other party
violated a constitutional norm governing the confirmation process.
Packing would be justified in that situation only if it were a
proportionate response to the norm violation.
Proportionality is a vitally important concept when the majority
party in the political branches is considering how to respond after the
other party has violated a constitutional norm to affect the Court’s
composition.181 Proportionality does not mean an identical response to
the other party’s norm violation, but it does mean not responding in a
way that is substantially out of proportion to the underlying violation.
Proportionality is relevant to assessing both the motivation for a
particular response and the genuineness of the expressed concern
about the violation of the underlying norm. Even more importantly,
proportionality cabins the harm to the Court’s legitimacy and efficacy
180. Whether the addition of one Justice or two would be potentially justified would depend
upon the circumstances. For example, if no Justice would have been appointed absent the bribery,
or if a more moderate Justice would have been appointed absent the bribery, then the addition
of two Justices could constitute a proportionate response. By contrast, if a different Justice of
similar ideology would have been appointed absent the bribery, then the addition of no more than
one Justice could be potentially justified. Of course, in the real world, it may be impossible to
know for certain what would have happened absent the bribery. Principled politicians must
nonetheless muddle through and do the best they can.
181. Siegel, After the Trump Era, supra note 28, at 169 (discussing the value of proportionality
in disputes over judicial appointments and in international law).
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while still enabling a political party to deter and punish misconduct by
the other party, thereby protecting the responding party’s own
democratic authority to affect the Court’s composition through the
regular appointments process. Proportionality is a limit on all three of
the justifications for Court-packing discussed in this Section.
Second, there might be extraordinary circumstances in which
Court-packing would restore the Court’s legitimacy when its legitimacy
is threatened by the Court’s own behavior. Court-packing might be
legitimacy improving if the Justices were to issue decisions that a large
majority of Americans viewed as extreme and damaging—as a radical
lurch in a particular ideological or interpretive direction that decimated
basic institutions or tore at the fabric of constitutional law. These
triggers are unavoidably vague, but the general ideas they capture are
indispensable if one cares about the Court’s legitimacy and
functioning. Possible examples might include invalidating the modern
administrative state, Social Security, Medicare, or paper money on
purportedly originalist grounds.
Or imagine that a conservative Court or a progressive Court
simply stopped trying to do constitutional law. Imagine that the Court
majority instead decided every case based upon its perception of what
would benefit the political party that appointed its members. Further
imagine that we knew this was going on because the Justices told us in
their opinions. In such a situation, Court-packing would be justified to
restore the Court’s legitimacy and proper functioning. Moreover, to
return to the prior discussion about the constitutionality of Courtpacking, it seems problematic to suggest that Court-packing would be
unconstitutional even in this situation and that the only constitutionally
permissible recourse would be the impeachment process.182 Given the
partisan intent and consequences of the Court’s decision-making, the
two-thirds requirement to obtain a conviction in the Senate might be
impossible to satisfy.183 Such a scenario appears quite unrealistic, but
realism is not the point of some hypotheticals. The very possibility of
an unhinged, expressly partisan Court, however remote, means it is
wrong to assert that Court-packing could never be justified.
Court-packing might also be justified in extreme circumstances to
restore judicial legitimacy in response to the corrupt behavior of an
individual Justice. If a Justice were to take bribes, or to hold political
182. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (subjecting “all civil Officers,” which includes federal judges, to
removal via impeachment and conviction).
183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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strategy sessions with partisan political actors, or to repeatedly refuse
to recuse themself in cases in which their impartiality could obviously
be questioned due to a personal conflict of interest (and then to vote
in ways that validated the skepticism), adding a seat or two to the Court
might be a way to offset their voting power.184 Impeachment and
removal would be the preferred way to deal with such a Justice,
particularly because adding a seat or two would not always succeed in
diluting their voting power—it would depend upon whether and how
the Court was divided in the cases in which their votes were corrupt.
To reiterate, however, satisfying the two-thirds requirement to convict
in the Senate might not be possible in hyperpolarized eras, and Courtpacking might be the only option available.
Third, there might arise national crises to which the Court was
contributing without devastating its own legitimacy in the eyes of a
large majority of Americans, in which case it would be more important
to respond effectively to the crisis by controlling seats on the Court
than to mind the Court’s legitimacy. Of course, the president and
congressional majorities would need to want to respond to the crisis; if
they caused or condoned the crisis, Court-packing would be politically
impossible.185 Perhaps the struggle to create a reconstructed Union that
was less savagely racist in the wake of an epic civil war and the
assassination of the president counted as such a crisis. As discussed
earlier,186 congressional Republicans reduced the size of the Court to
prevent President Andrew Johnson from making appointments and
then increased its size when he was no longer president. The Court had
contributed to the crisis of the Civil War by delivering the remarkable

184. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (describing the circumstances in which a federal “[J]ustice, judge, or
magistrate judge” must disqualify themselves, including where their “impartiality might
reasonably be questioned,” where “[they] ha[ve] a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding,” or where they,
their spouse, or their minor child has an “interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding”). The point is obviously not that the Court should be packed if a
Justice violates § 455. The point, rather, is that there may come a point at which a Justice has
revealed themself to be so corrupt that adding a seat or two would be justified to protect the
Court’s legitimacy.
185. There may be a broader lesson here about the perils of relying upon Court-packing as a
failsafe protection of U.S. constitutional democracy in a crisis, even during the rare circumstances
in which packing would be justified. Indeed, Part V argues that a packed Court might well be
defied by a populist president. See infra text following note 271.
186. See supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text.
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conclusion in Scott v. Sandford187 that Congress lacked the power to
ban slavery in the territories.188
To offer another potential example, perhaps the Court should be
packed while there is still time if it refuses to halt increasingly
successful efforts by one political party to entrench itself in power by
antidemocratic means.189 And perhaps a Court that tried to enable a
president to steal an election—to seriously damage U.S. democracy—
should be packed. Some things matter more than the Court’s
legitimacy and efficacy. If the Court is contributing to a crisis, then
packing it can be a way of cutting it off at its knees.
Two necessary conditions bind the foregoing examples together
and might form standards or criteria for determining when Courtpacking would be justified in response to a crisis. First, the examples
involve high stakes for profoundly important constitutional or other
human values. Second, and most critically, there is something about the
examples that persuasively sets them apart from politics as usual—
from mainstream partisan disagreements. Animating this second
proposed criterion is the conviction that the damage to the Court’s
functioning, and so to the country, of packing the Court is more costly
than the benefit of temporarily seizing control of it to try to better
address issues of deep contemporary disagreement. Some people who
believe, for example, that there is currently a crisis over voting rights
187. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend XIV. Scott arose when Dred and Harriet Scott sued for legal
recognition of their freedom. Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://
www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/dred-scott-v-sandford [https://perma.cc/67W2-5BVB].
The Court denied the Scotts their freedom in part on the ground that enslaved persons and their
descendants, even those legally free, were not citizens and so could not invoke the diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id.
188. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 432–42; see, e.g., Ariela Gross, Slavery, Anti-Slavery, and the
Coming of the Civil War, in II CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE LONG
NINETEENTH CENTURY (1789-1920), at 280, 311 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds.,
2008) (“Dred Scott almost certainly contributed to the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and
the onset of the Civil War the following year.”).
189. The Court refused to do anything about massive race-based disenfranchisements by
authoritarian Democratic regimes in the American South for the better part of a century. See,
e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). The political branches did not deem the situation a
national crisis to which the Court was contributing. On the contrary, the Court did nothing, in
part because the political branches refused to intervene:
Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that State by officers of the court, it
seems to us that all that the plaintiff could get from equity would be an empty form.
Apart from damages to the individual, relief from a great political wrong, if done, as
alleged, by the people of a State and the State itself, must be given by them or by the
legislative and political department of the government of the United States.
Id. at 488.
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or abortion rights or that climate change poses an existential threat to
humanity may weigh the costs and benefits differently. But these same
people must grapple with the fact that, on the same theory, other
people may conclude, for example, that invalidating the Affordable
Care Act, excluding gay and transgender Americans from marriage or
the workplace, or prohibiting abortion nationally justifies packing the
Court.
B. A Framework for Analyzing Legislative Means
Circumstances may arise in which people reasonably disagree
regarding what proportionality entails, when Court-packing would
likely restore judicial legitimacy, and when a crisis exists to which the
Court is contributing. They may disagree about whether some of the
above hypotheticals fall within one of these three categories. And they
may disagree about whether the requirements for invoking an
exception to the bar on Court-packing have already been satisfied, a
topic analyzed in the next Part. The promise of the framework offered
here is not to end such disagreements but to channel them into
constructive debates over whether a particular exception is implicated.
It would ultimately be for Congress and the president to answer such
questions for themselves.
A sensible way to proceed—one that would both improve the
analytical framework and potentially reduce the level of disagreement
regarding how to apply it—would be to use a less-legitimacy-reducing
means analysis. In addition to asking whether a compelling interest
justified Court-packing (that is, counter-packing, restoration of judicial
legitimacy, or national crisis to which the Court was contributing), the
political branches would ask themselves whether Court-packing was
necessary to advance one of these interests, or whether a legislative
alternative existed that would advance the compelling interest about as
much while damaging judicial legitimacy less. For example, members
of Congress might disagree about whether one political party was
seeking to entrench itself in power by antidemocratic means—say, by
passing a series of measures state-by-state that made it more difficult
for voters of the other political party to vote. Members might further
disagree about whether the situation amounted to a crisis that
imperiled U.S. democracy. They might nonetheless be able to agree
that Court-packing should be the last resort, not the first. The first
resort would be for the other party, when it controlled the political
branches, to pass strong voting rights protections preempting the state
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measures.190 If Congress and the president lacked the political will to
enact such legislation (which would likely require terminating the
legislative filibuster in the Senate), then they would also lack the will
to pack the Court (which would also likely require terminating the
filibuster).191 If the political branches possessed the will to pass such
legislation, then they should await the Court’s response to it before
passing legislation to pack the Court.192
C. The Costs of Delaying or Declining the Chance to Pack the Court
One objection to this approach is that it might be too late to pack
the Court if the party in control of the political branches were to wait
to learn whether the Court would invalidate the legislation. At this
point, unified government might no longer exist, so Court-packing
might not remain politically possible. Although there is some force to
this argument, the difficulty with it is that it would not be politically
feasible to pack the Court if the U.S. public broadly opposed it. And if
the public broadly supported it, then a crisis point would likely have
been reached, in which case the party seeking to pack the Court would
probably be able to run effectively on a platform of Court-packing.193
Put differently, if the situation truly is pack now or pack never, then
Court-packing is likely not a politically viable idea to begin with.
No doubt, the democratic costs associated with limiting Courtpacking to extreme situations—to asking whether a Court-packing
plan meets the equivalent of strict scrutiny—can sometimes be high. In

190. See, e.g., Freedom To Vote Act, S. 2747, 117th Cong. (2021); John R. Lewis Voting
Rights Advancement Act of 2021, H.R. 4, 117th Cong.
191. Under Senate Rule 22.2, a motion to end debate “shall be decided . . . by three-fifths of
the Senators duly chosen and sworn—except on a measure or motion to amend the Senate rules,
in which case the necessary affirmative vote shall be two-thirds of the Senators duly present and
voting.” S. Doc. No. 116-1, at 21 (2020).
192. Congress could also pass legislation protecting abortion rights by using the Interstate
Commerce Clause. E.g., Women’s Health Protection Act of 2021, S. 1975, 117th Cong.; Women’s
Health Protection Act of 2021, H.R. 3755, 117th Cong. Unlike the scope of congressional power
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the scope of Congress’s authority under the
Interstate Commerce Clause does not depend upon whether the Court recognizes a constitutional
right to abortion. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (articulating the
“congruence and proportionality” test for Section Five legislation only); cf., e.g., Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (“Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.”).
193. The objection that antidemocratic measures may render it impossible to win future
elections is discussed infra Part V.B.2.
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Marbury v. Madison,194 Chief Justice Marshall, like Alexander
Hamilton before him,195 suppressed the reality of often deep
disagreements about the meaning of the Constitution.196 When such
disagreements exist, the Court may prevent democratic majorities,
including congressional majorities, from governing for reasons that are
constitutionally questionable. It may take a long time for such
majorities to change either the Court’s view through litigation or its
composition through the regular appointments process. Alexander
Bickel saw through Hamilton and Marshall in coining the phrase, “The
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty.”197
These costs are real, and those who oppose Court-packing in all
but extreme situations cannot responsibly wish them away. But there
is more to be said about the Court’s relationship to democratic values
and about the significance of constitutional values other than
democratic ones. The Court, like the Constitution itself, plays an
important role in enabling democratic politics by structuring how those
politics occur—for example, by enforcing constitutional rules
regarding how a bill becomes a law or who gets to make which
appointments. With rules like these in place, participants in democratic
politics may more easily debate and temporarily decide matters of
substance. Moreover, as already noted, the Court is charged with
playing a prominent part in protecting the integrity of the democratic
process from attempts by current majorities or powerful politicians to
entrench themselves in power. The Court does so, for example, when
it rejects bogus claims of election fraud and protects political speech
and rights of association and voting.198And the Court protects the
fundamental rights of outvoted minorities from being infringed
through the democratic process, which few would argue is improper. In
other words, insulating the institution of judicial review from Courtpacking can be democracy enhancing, not just democracy reducing,
and it can vindicate constitutional values as important as the
194. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
195. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 467–68 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that
judicial review does not “by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative
power,” but “only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both”).
196. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175–78 (defending judicial review in a manner that begs
the question of who decides the meaning of the Constitution amidst disagreements about its
meaning).
197. BICKEL, supra note 36.
198. For the classic “participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial
review” that rests upon this insight, see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87 (1980).

SIEGEL PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

9/16/2022 11:52 AM

THE TROUBLE WITH COURT-PACKING

129

democratic values with which they may trade off. Bickel’s purpose was
to shore up judicial review, not to degrade it.
D. Why Not Close the Door Completely?
A standard providing that Court-packing is off the table except
in extraordinary circumstances leaves the door open for both political
parties and their supporters to routinely claim that such circumstances
exist. For example, it is relatively common now for supporters of
Court-packing to insist that there is a crisis given, among other things,
the Court’s willingness to uphold voting restrictions passed by
Republican-led state legislatures.199 The Court’s June 2022 decision in
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,200 which overruled
Roe v. Wade201 and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey,202 will almost certainly increase declarations that such a crisis
exists; it may become an article of faith among many Democrats to
pack the Court as soon as they have the votes.203 Given the potential
for constant invocations of a crisis situation, a better approach might
be to defend a rule that Court-packing is always prohibited and to trust
that in genuinely extreme circumstances, such as the ones this Article
has posited, Court-packing will happen anyway—the emergency itself
will be proof of the necessity.

199. For examples of this insistence, see supra note 7 and accompanying text. For discussion
of the probable efficacy of contemporary voting restrictions, see infra Part V.B.2.
200. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
201. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled by Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. 2228.
202. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), overruled by Dobbs, 142 S.
Ct. 2228.
203. See, e.g., Press Release, Cong. Progressive Caucus, Congressional Progressive Caucus
Endorses Judiciary Act To Expand the Supreme Court (Jan. 5, 2022), https://progressiv
es.house.gov/2022/1/congressional-progressive-caucus-endorses-judiciary-act-to-expand-the-sup
reme-court [https://perma.cc/WL9V-F7SA] (reporting that “Representative Pramila Jayapal
(WA-07), chair of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, announced today that the membership
of the CPC voted to endorse legislation to expand the United States Supreme Court by four
seats,” and quoting Representative Jayapal as saying that “[i]n recent years, this [C]ourt has
gutted the Voting Rights Act and public sector unions, entrenched unconstitutional abortion
bans, and failed to overturn the blatantly discriminatory Muslim Ban”); Elizabeth Warren,
Opinion, Expand the Supreme Court, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.boston
globe.com/2021/12/15/opinion/expand-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/V5KG-CFVJ] (“This
month, a majority of [J]ustices on the United States Supreme Court signaled their willingness to
gut one of the court’s most important decisions over the past century, threatening to eliminate
Roe v. Wade and a person’s right to choose.”).
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This objection may be correct as a strategic, prophylactic matter,
but it is not correct in principle, nor does it try to be. When the question
is the permissibility of Court-packing as a matter of constitutional
policy, “almost never” is a more persuasive answer than “never.” This
Article has identified extreme situations in which the Court should
likely or clearly be packed. It does not serve the interests of truth to
suggest otherwise. For example, a Court that simply stopped trying to
do law, or threw the country into financial chaos, or rendered a series
of decisions that a large majority of the country rejected as extreme
and illegitimate, would need to be dealt with by any lawful means
available. Moreover, it is likely salutary for the Justices to know this,
even though it compromises judicial independence to some extent.204
V. PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT JUSTIFY COURT-PACKING
This Part considers current proposals to expand the Court. To the
extent that some of them are animated by good-government rationales,
this Article does not object to them, although it does insist that these
proposals will be subject to the criticisms offered here insofar as they
become an exercise in partisan packing. In any event, most current
proposals are unapologetically Court-packing plans, and this Part
analyzes whether they are justified either as a proportionate response
to norm violations by Senate Republicans or by the content and
direction of the Court’s decisions, especially in the area of voting rights
and access to the democratic process. The Part argues that Senate
Republicans likely did violate an important norm governing the
Supreme Court confirmation process. It further argues that some of the
Court’s voting rights decisions raise concerns about the Court’s role in
supporting attempts by the Republican Party to entrench itself in
power by antidemocratic means. But it concludes that Court-packing
would not be a proportionate response to the Republican norm
violation, nor would it be justified at present on grounds of legitimacy
restoration or national crisis—although the Court’s recent, radical
decision in Dobbs offers a sobering reminder that the Court’s own
behavior may change the calculus at a certain point.

204. Feldman, supra note 26, at 10–11 (writing that “[t]he Justices can still interpret the
Constitution by their own lights,” but that “if their interpretations over time go so far away from
mainstream constitutional opinion that they cause the court to lose legitimacy, the [J]ustices know
that it could lead to substantial loss of independence in the form of court-packing, jurisdictionstripping, and their consequences”).
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A. Good-Government Proposals
Some proponents of adding seats to the Court contend that an
expanded Court would be able to decide more cases, spend more time
on emergency applications, and reflect greater diversity along various
dimensions of potentially relevant differences.205 This Article does not
object in principle to these rationales insofar as they are genuine, but
it does caution that if a proposal based upon some or all of them were
pursued, it would be important for Congress to be disciplined by the
stated rationales so that they did not become an excuse for partisan
packing. One way to do so would be to permit the political opposition
to select half of the nominees. Another way would be to establish a
schedule for expansion over the course of, say, eight to twelve years—
and so behind a veil of ignorance as to which party would control the
presidency or the Senate. Either approach would likely eliminate any
temptation to turn good-government goals into a rationalization for
seizing ideological control of the Court.206
As discussed earlier, one could question the conceptual coherence
of the distinction between good-government reasons for expanding the
size of the Court and Court-packing.207 For example, if diversity is
understood to mean ideological diversity, and if ideology is highly
correlated with partisanship, then the distinction collapses. But
diversity need not mean—or need not only mean—ideological
diversity. For example, it could also mean professional background,
personal experiences, race, ethnicity, religion, geography,
socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, and gender identity.
Moreover, like other defensible distinctions, this one should not be
abandoned just because there are potentially difficult cases on the
margins. Among many other unproblematic applications of the
distinction, wanting a liberal majority on the Court and wanting the
Court to decide more cases are clearly different objectives. It is also
not obvious that adding more Justices would be necessary for the Court

205. BIDEN COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 78–79.
206. As for the objection that only Democrats care about the good-government goals stated
in the text, workload concerns are not partisan, and the Republican Party put the first woman on
the Court (Justice Sandra Day O’Connor); replaced Justice Thurgood Marshall with a Black man
(Justice Clarence Thomas); and replaced Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg with a woman (Justice
Amy Coney Barrett).
207. See supra notes 144–146 and accompanying text (analyzing the destabilization of the
distinction in the Biden Commission Report).
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to decide more cases—or that it would even be conducive to doing so.208
In addition, and to reiterate, the distinction can be maintained
functionally by asking whether those seeking to expand the Court are
willing to let the other party choose half the nominees or to schedule
the expansion over time.
B. Court-Packing Proposals
Most current proponents of Court expansion do not argue that
there are good-government reasons for expanding the size of the Court
at this time. Rather, they advocate Court-packing.209 Based on the
analysis set forth above, packing the Court can potentially be justified
only if: (1) it would respond proportionately to previous unjustified
Court-packing or another equally serious norm violation by the
political opposition; (2) it would restore the Court’s legitimacy given
the Court’s legitimacy-reducing decision-making; or (3) it would meet
a crisis to which the Court was contributing. Moreover, even if one of
these three compelling interests existed, Court-packing would be
justified only if no less-legitimacy-reducing alternative were available.
The remainder of this Part considers these criteria. The first Section
focuses on Court-packing in response to the Republicans’ violation of
a constitutional norm, the second turns to whether Court-packing
would restore the Court’s legitimacy, and the third analyzes whether
Court-packing would respond effectively to a national crisis partially
of the Court’s own making, especially with respect to voting rights and
access to the democratic process.

208. Congress could require the Court to decide more cases by contracting its discretionary
certiorari jurisdiction and expanding its mandatory appellate jurisdiction. BIDEN COMM’N
REPORT, supra note 5, at 78. (If Congress were to do so, it might be prudent to give each Justice
additional law clerks and to expand the number of research librarians in the Supreme Court’s
library.) Moreover, the Court during the 1980s decided roughly twice as many cases as it decides
today, even though the number of Justices has remained at nine during this period. Id. It is
therefore not clear that the primary impediment (if there is one) to the Court’s deciding more
cases is the number of Justices. Finally, a greater number of Justices can make it more difficult to
decide cases because a greater number of minds must agree to dispose of cases. See, e.g., Duke
Univ. Sch. of L., Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Discusses the 2015–16 Term at
44:30, YOUTUBE (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ebapaBtXH8 [https://
perma.cc/DV2K-62WJ] (quoting Justice Ginsburg on why she opposed a Court with more than
nine members).
209. See, e.g., supra note 117 and accompanying text (quoting Professor Tushnet’s
observation that “[t]he difficulty for Democrats is that they can’t really come up with decent goodgovernment reasons for adding two justices to the Supreme Court”).
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1. Court-Packing in Response to a Norm Violation. A key
rationale for current Court-packing proposals is that they are a
proportionate response to norm-violating politicization of the
confirmation process by Senate Republicans. These proposals are
properly described as recommending Court-packing broadly
conceived; they are intended, in significant part, to affect the Court’s
decision-making going forward.210 But in contrast to advocacy of
Court-packing based on the content of the Court’s decisions to date or
on a general desire to change the Court’s decision-making going
forward, the allegation that a political party has abused the
confirmation process, insofar as it is accurate and genuine,
distinguishes recent proposals from past instances of actual or
attempted Court-packing and raises the possibility that Court-packing
would now be justified.
This point bears repeating—the allegation of a violation of a
constitutional norm, combined with a refusal to be bound by the stated
reason for the norm violation, is essential to the case for Court-packing
in this political moment. So the allegation warrants careful scrutiny,
even at the cost of wading into recent partisan debates. It is unlikely
that the Biden Commission would have been formed but for this
allegation. During the contemporary era of U.S. constitutional politics,
there was no serious talk of Court-packing after the confirmations of
Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Samuel Alito, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan, notwithstanding very
controversial decisions such as Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,211 National Federation of Independent Businesses v.
Sebelius,212 Shelby County v. Holder,213 King v. Burwell,214 Obergefell v.
210. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Advocates of Court expansion who focus on
the content of the Court’s decisions are plainly advocating Court-packing. Advocates who focus
on the behavior of Senate Republicans also tend to emphasize the content of the Court’s
decisions, but even if they did not, they would still be advocating Court-packing. Their advocacy
would presumably subside if the Court started deciding major cases in ways they approve of. They
want to add seats to the Court at least partly to change the Court’s decision-making.
211. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (overruling precedent in holding that,
because political spending is protected speech, the government may not prohibit corporations or
unions from spending money to support or denounce candidates in elections).
212. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (upholding most of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)).
213. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (invalidating the coverage formula in
Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act).
214. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) (rejecting a statutory challenge to the ACA that, if
successful, would have severely impaired the law’s functioning).
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Hodges,215 Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees,216 and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.217
Regarding the allegation of abuse of the confirmation process, the
president and Congress would need to make a judgment about the
recent behavior of Senate Republicans. If they agreed that Senate
Republicans practiced the sort of judicial-legitimacy-undermining
partisan politics that attempts at Court-packing generally involve, then
adding seats would be on the table for discussion. Before this Author
offers his own position on the issue, it is important to acknowledge the
existence of robust disagreements—primarily along lines of ideology
and party affiliation—over the allocation of responsibility for what has
become of the Supreme Court confirmation process. It is also
important to acknowledge the great difficulty of bridging the divide
and persuading anyone who does not already agree with the view being
expressed.218 Even so, there is a difference between neutrality and
objectivity, and it is neutral—not objective—to refuse to critically
assess the conduct of Senate Republicans in recent years, or to simply
insist that both parties are equally to blame as soon as criticisms are
offered of one side.
The following position is informed by both this Author’s academic
work and—full disclosure—his service as special counsel to
Democratic senators on the Judiciary Committee during the
confirmation hearings of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices
Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett,
and Ketanji Brown-Jackson. From this Author’s standpoint, the
conduct of Senate Republicans beginning after Justice Scalia’s death
and through their confirmation of Justice Barrett was a norm-violating,

215. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (holding that the fundamental right to marry
includes same-sex marriage).
216. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (overruling
precedent in holding that a state’s extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector
employees violates the First Amendment).
217. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582 (2016) (holding that provisions of
Texas law requiring doctors who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a nearby
hospital and requiring abortion clinics to have facilities comparable to ambulatory surgical centers
violates the abortion right), abrogated by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228
(2022).
218. See Mark Tushnet, The Pirate’s Code: Constitutional Conventions in U.S. Constitutional
Law, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 481, 486 (2018) (arguing that “deep partisanship” drives allegations by one
party that the other has violated a constitutional convention governing the Supreme Court
confirmation process).
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significant escalation of prior questionable behavior by both parties
regarding judicial nominations, and the conduct of Senate Republicans
likely damaged the Court’s legitimacy and the appointments process.
As is well-known, Senate Republicans refused to consider any
Democratic nominee with nearly a year to go in President Barack
Obama’s term on the stated ground that it was too close to the 2016
elections and Americans should have a say in who nominates the next
Justice.219 This conduct likely violated a constitutional norm requiring
consideration of Supreme Court nominees regardless of the year of the
presidency in which the vacancy occurs. The norm is reflected in the
felt need of Senate Republicans to offer a justification other than
partisanship or ideological opposition; in the outraged reaction of
Senate Democrats to the norm violation;220 in the extraordinarily
uncommon nature of the Senate’s refusal to hold, or even to schedule,
a confirmation hearing for a Supreme Court nominee of a president of
the other party based on partisan or ideological objections to the
nominee;221 and in the longstanding historical practice of considering—
219. Letter from Senate Judiciary Committee Republicans to Mitch McConnell, Senate
Majority Leader (Feb. 23, 2016) (quoted in News Release, Senate Judiciary Republicans,
Judiciary Committee Republicans to McConnell: No Hearings on Supreme Court Nomination
(Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/judiciary-committee-repub
licans-mcconnell-no-hearings-supreme-court-nomination [https://perma.cc/6NMG-XTEB]) (“As
we mourn the tragic loss of Justice Antonin Scalia, and celebrate his life’s work, the American
people are presented with an exceedingly rare opportunity to decide, in a very real and concrete
way, the direction the Court will take over the next generation. We believe The People should
have this opportunity.”); see also 162 CONG. REC. S5443 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2016) (statement of
Sen. Grassley) (“We have made the decision that the next President will select the next Justice of
the Supreme Court.”).
220. Whether norms endure depends not upon whether they are violated, but upon how
other members of the relevant community respond when they are violated. If a community is
following a practice without deviation, there is no opportunity to know whether, in what way, or
to what extent it is understood to be obligatory. It is only when there are breaches that this
articulation becomes important. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law
Adjudication as Common Law Adjudication, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
CHANGING WORLD 57 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016). This is a general point about customary law
and norms and their identification; it is also true of conventions, constitutional conventions,
historical gloss, customary international law, and customary domestic law.
221. The Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) reports that “Supreme Court
nominations since 1949 have routinely received public confirmation hearings before either the
Senate Judiciary Committee or a Judiciary subcommittee.” BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R44236, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS: CONSIDERATION BY THE SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 10 (2021). CRS further reports that “[o]verall, from the nomination of
Tom Clark in 1949 through the nomination of Amy Coney Barrett in 2020, 36 of 40 Supreme
Court nominations (90%) received hearings.” Id. at 11. The four nominees who did not receive
hearings were John Marshall Harlan II in 1954; John Roberts, Jr. in 2005 (because he was
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although not necessarily confirming—Supreme Court nominees.
Examining this practice beginning early in U.S. history, Professors
Robin Bradley Kar and Jason Mazzone conclude that it is most
consistent with a norm prohibiting the Senate from deliberately
transferring one president’s Supreme Court appointment power to a
successor except when the president’s status as the most recently
elected president is in doubt.222 Part of the modern practice has
included Democratic Senates confirming Republican nominees
Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas.223
The norm is also implied in the constitutional text and structure.
The Appointments Clause provides that the president nominates, and
the Senate decides whether to approve. The structure assumes that this
process will actually function; otherwise, nothing would stop the Senate
from going years without voting on a nominee. Moreover, political
accountability, which the Seventeenth Amendment seeks to secure,
works well only when Americans know what position each Senator is
taking on a nominee.224 This consideration presumably helps explain
why Senate Republicans refused to consider then-Chief Judge Merrick
Garland at all instead of considering him and then trying to vote him
down on the floor. Senators are individuals, and not voting on
Garland’s nomination presumably gave some of these individuals
political cover. It is doubtful that Senate Republicans, whose ranks at
the time included the moderates Susan Collins, Mark Kirk, and Lisa
Murkowski, would have been unanimous had a floor vote been taken.
Rather than explain why they were changing the pre-existing norm
instead of violating it, and rather than offer a weighty reason to justify
their behavior, Republicans invoked a democratic “principle” that

renominated to be Chief Justice and confirmed in 2005); Harriet Miers in 2005 (because she
withdrew under pressure from her own party); and Merrick Garland in 2016. Id. With respect to
the scheduling of hearings, Garland’s nomination “is the second nomination to the Court since
1949 for which no hearings were scheduled,” and “[t]he Garland nomination is . . . distinct from
the nomination of Mr. Harlan in 1954 in that Mr. Harlan’s nomination was resubmitted in 1955,
hearings were held on that nomination, and Mr. Harlan was subsequently confirmed by the
Senate” by a vote of 77–11. Id. Since nominees began routinely receiving hearings in 1949, the
treatment of Garland stands alone.
222. See Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the
Constitution Really Say About President Obama’s Powers To Appoint a Replacement for Justice
Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 72 (2016).
223. Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV.
381, 407.
224. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for direct election of U.S. Senators).
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cannot be reconciled with the decision of Americans to elect the prior
president to serve a constitutionally mandated four-year term.
“Because our decision is based on constitutional principle and born of
a necessity to protect the will of the American people,” Republicans
on the Judiciary Committee explained in a letter, “this Committee will
not hold hearings on any Supreme Court nominee until after our next
President is sworn in on January 20, 2017.”225 If there were any doubt
that not even Senate Republicans believed in their own stated
principle, such doubt was dispelled when they refused to be bound by
it. In 2020, they confirmed a Supreme Court nominee with only days to
go before the next elections.226 The only consideration reconciling such
conduct appears to be a level of partisanship that may be
unprecedented in modern U.S. confirmation politics. The notion that
holding a Senate majority is a license to consider Supreme Court
nominees of same-party presidents while refusing to consider
nominees of opposite-party presidents produces the result that no
nominees will be considered unless the same party controls the White
House and the Senate. This may be the situation we are in now, and it
threatens to undermine the Court’s legitimacy as a legal institution.
A likely response is that Senate Democrats have behaved just as
badly, or even “started it.” One can plausibly criticize the treatment of
Judge Robert Bork by Senate Democrats. Although the point was
disputed by Democrats at the time,227 the pre-existing norm had
arguably been that Supreme Court nominees were to be confirmed if
they were professionally competent, had a judicial temperament, and
were of good moral character.228 Judge Bork checked all of these boxes.
Senate Democrats were not denying, however, that they were

225. Letter from Senate Judiciary Committee Republicans to Mitch McConnell, Senate
Majority Leader, supra note 219.
226. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, How Mitch McConnell Delivered Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s
Rapid Confirmation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/27/us/
mcconnell-barrett-confirmation.html [https://perma.cc/Q8U7-JW2V].
227. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. 20,908–15 (1987) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden) (arguing
“that, in case after case, [the Senate] has scrutinized Supreme Court nominees on the basis of
their political and judicial philosophies” and “that, in case after case, it has rejected qualified
nominees, because it perceived those views to clash with the interests of the country”).
228. For a nuanced empirical analysis, see generally Lee Epstein, René Lindstäd, Jeffrey A.
Segal & Chad Westerland, The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court
Nominees, 68 J. POL. 296 (2006), confirming the conventional wisdom that the Bork hearings
substantially increased the importance of ideology in the Senate’s voting on Supreme Court
nominees but also finding that the Senate’s emphasis on ideology began in the 1950s.
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considering Judge Bork’s ideology. Instead, they were defending a
different norm: the Senate can consider any factor, including ideology,
that the president considered in choosing the nominee. They also
insisted that President Reagan had considered Judge Bork’s
ideology.229 Perhaps this is a bad norm, but in terms of politicization of
the confirmation process, there is a major difference between voting
down a nominee on the merits as ideologically extreme in the Senate’s
view (and then confirming a replacement that was still conservative but
was perceived to be less extreme), and refusing to meet with or conduct
hearings for any nominee of the other party, no matter how
ideologically moderate. To insist that this is a distinction without a
relevant difference—that the decision is between a Senate that imposes
no ideological constraints on the choice of a president of the other
party no matter how extreme the nominee is perceived to be, and a
Senate that engages in open ideological warfare against any choice of
a president of the other party no matter how moderate the nominee is
perceived to be—is really to attack the very idea of the Court as a legal
institution. It is to reject the idea of the Court as an institution that is
appropriately influenced, but not appropriately overwhelmed, by the
ideological priorities of the two parties.
It would be inconsistent for the same commentator to justify or
excuse the behavior of Senate Republicans as mere norm-free partisan
politics as usual, notwithstanding the nature of their behavior and its
impact on perceptions of the Court while, at the same time,
condemning Court-packing as normatively out of bounds because of its
nature and impact on perceptions of the Court. The behavior of Senate
Republicans resides within the same normative realm as Court-packing
absent extraordinary circumstances. In this realm, politics consists only
of the indulgence of one’s ideological appetites and the exercise of
one’s will—the antithesis of the conception of democratic politics
described and practiced by the likes of Burke, Washington, Madison,
and Jefferson.230 It might therefore be a proportionate response for
Senate Democrats to refuse to confirm any Republican Supreme Court
nominee in the years ahead or to confirm a Democratic nominee in the

229. See 133 CONG. REC. 20,915 (1987) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden) (“[W]e are once
again confronted with a popular President’s determined attempt to bend the Supreme Court to
his political ends. No one should dispute his right to try. But no one should dispute the Senate’s
duty to respond.”).
230. See Siegel, After the Trump Era, supra note 28, at 127–37 (examining the views of these
politicians, some of whom were also theorists).
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days before the next set of elections or even during the lame duck
session after the elections.
It would not be a proportionate response, however, to add four
seats to the Court. If Senate Republicans were entitled either to Justice
Gorsuch or to Justice Barrett but not both, then adding two Justices
nominated by a Democratic President would “neutralize” the presence
of one of these two Justices on the Court. (Regardless of whether one
believes the ethical allegations made against Justice Kavanaugh,231 the
Republican Party was going to fill Justice Kennedy’s seat anyway,
unless one makes the implausible assumption that the defeat of
Kavanaugh’s nomination would have caused the Democrats to win
back the Senate.232) Proposals to add four seats, rather than two,
appear motivated by a desire to create a Court with a Democraticappointed majority, not by a desire to respond proportionately to a
norm violation.
In addition, it is not clear that adding two seats total to the Court
would be a proportionate response to Republican politicization of the
confirmation process. Senate Republicans likely violated an important
constitutional norm in declining even to consider a Democratic
nominee and then added hypocrisy to their prior norm violation. But
they did not violate a norm as significant as the one against Courtpacking. As discussed above, only Court-packing creates the
opportunity to appoint multiple Justices all at once, which helps
explain why most ordinary Americans, legal experts, and elected
officials view Court-packing as different in nature from, and more
threatening to the system than, playing constitutional hardball with
open seats on the Court.233 Disturbing the stability of the Court’s
composition for the first time in 150 years would risk damaging the
Court’s standing in a significant way—not only the legitimacy of the
Court that would presumably result, but also that of the progressive
and conservative Courts of the future. The damage to the Court’s

231. Kang, supra note 13 (arguing that, “[i]n the past five years, Republicans have used their
political power to . . . [d]iscard multiple credible allegations of sexual assault and perjury against
Brett Kavanaugh and confirm him without legitimate investigation”).
232. There were fifty-one Republicans in the Senate before the 2018 mid-term elections and
fifty-three after them. See Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/
partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/G8UN-AKZA].
233. On public opinion, see supra note 117 and accompanying text. On the views of legal
experts, see supra notes 87, 113, and accompanying text. On the views of elected officials, it
suffices to note that Court-packing bills in Congress have not come remotely close to passing
notwithstanding unified Democratic government from 2020 to 2022.
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legitimacy—and therefore to its efficacy—would likely be greater than
the damage that Senate Republicans have caused because packing the
Court would likely unleash subsequent rounds of Court-packing
whenever one party fully controlled the political branches.
The damage to the Court might be less if two seats were added
than if four were added. With only two seats added, the Court would
still have a conservative majority, so the packing could more readily
(and genuinely) be framed as proportionate, tit-for-tat retaliation for a
previous norm violation. Perhaps such messaging would avoid the
public perception that the Court had been packed with partisans to
achieve particular results, in which case the public might not view a
Republican response in kind as justified, and an arms race might be
somewhat less inevitable. Although theoretically possible, it seems
more likely that Republican politicians would add two seats to the
Court as soon as they presided over unified government. They reject
any suggestion that they behaved improperly in the recent past,234 as
does the Republican base, and both would almost certainly cry foul in
response to the Democrats’ two-Justice packing plan.
The fact that divided government has been the norm does not
meet the concern about erosion of the Court’s legitimacy. Nor does
certain political science scholarship suggesting that “[c]ourt expansion
would probably not blow up the Supreme Court to unreasonable
sizes.”235 Threats or promises to further pack the Court would likely
become part of every national election cycle. A norm violation within
the existing structure is not likely to affect perceptions of the Court as
much as a norm violation that changes the structure itself, with all of
the uncertainty and unpredictably that such a change may bring. There
will always be future seats on the Court to fill, but the country would

234. See, e.g., Allison Pecorin & Trish Turner, Senate Republicans Move Barrett Supreme
Court Nomination Toward Final Vote, ABC NEWS (Oct. 22, 2020, 11:53 AM), https://
abcn.ws/3dOsf0j [https://perma.cc/96W9-UJC2] (“Republicans have argued that GOP control of
both the Senate and the White House makes Barrett’s nomination proceedings different from
Garland’s, giving them an imperative to act quickly.”).
235. Sen, supra note 47, at 9. Much depends on the definition of “reasonable.” A Justice can
have difficulty persuading four of their colleagues to join their majority opinion. During an
interview in 2016, this Author asked Justice Ginsburg whether she would agree that nine is a good
number. She responded that she “certainly wouldn’t want any more” than nine Justices because
“four people have to agree with me.” Duke Univ. Sch. of L., supra note 208. In addition, the
greater the number of Justices, the lower the likelihood that the Court will be unanimous or nearunanimous in deciding cases, and the greater the likelihood that the Court will produce
fragmented decisions in which it may be difficult for the public to understand what the Court has
decided.
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likely never go back to nine Justices after the first round of Courtpacking.
In addition, before the retaliatory packing took place, there might
well be serious efforts to nullify Supreme Court decisions. A state
government or a successor president might not feel obliged to comply
with a 7–6 decision from a packed Court in which the seven Democratic
appointees were on the winning side and the six Republican appointees
were on the losing side. It does not require great imagination to worry
that the next populist Republican president would defy such a decision.
One instance of Court-packing, therefore, could expose the
vulnerability of the institution of judicial review.
Even within the existing structure itself, Senate Republicans made
the politics (potentially much) easier for themselves by not considering
Garland, but they were not ultimately obliged to vote to confirm him,
just as Senate Democrats voted down Judge Bork. And the
Republicans would not have been able to fill Justice Scalia’s seat
themselves had they not then proceeded to win control of both the
presidency and the Senate. In other words, unlike Court-packing, the
failure of Senate Republicans to consider Garland did not clearly and
by itself change the composition of the Court.
Contrary to what some proponents of Court-packing insist,236
Senate Republicans did not first “unpack” the Court by holding Justice
Scalia’s seat open for the duration of the Obama presidency and then
pack the Court by confirming Trump’s chosen nominee (then-Judge
Gorsuch) after Trump surprisingly won the 2016 election. It has always
been understood that unpacking the Court and packing it are
accomplished by passing statutes, which the Republicans did not enact.
There are reasons for this understanding. If a political party controls
the political branches and is willing to do away with the Senate
filibuster as to legislation, a Court-unpacking statute can be passed
without waiting for a vacancy on the Court to arise (although the
statute cannot force a Justice to resign237), and a Court-packing statute
can immediately add as many seats to the Court as the party wishes.
Senate Republicans, by contrast, had to wait for a vacancy to arise, and
236. See, e.g., Klarman, Foreword, supra note 7, at 247 (“The strongest argument for
Democrats to expand the Court’s size when they have the opportunity to do so is that they would
simply be ‘unpacking’ the Court.”); id. at 249 (“In essence, Senator McConnell managed to shrink
the size of the Court to eight for one year, then increase it back to nine after Trump became
President.”).
237. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. For the meaning of judicial service during “good Behavior,”
see supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
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they were able to fill the vacancy only because they proceeded to
maintain control of the Senate and to win the presidency. Even then,
they could not add additional seats to the Court. Such enormous
differences in the amount and immediacy of political power exercised
by a party explain why it is far more difficult to pass statutes than it is
to do what the Republicans did. For example, in this case, passing an
unpacking statute would have been politically impossible while Obama
was still president, and passing a packing statute after the election
would have required Senate Republicans to terminate the legislative
filibuster, which they did not want to do (and to retain their majority
in the House, which they did do).238
Moreover, as noted, the formal difference between playing
hardball with open seats on the Court and passing (un)packing statutes
is also likely to affect public perceptions of the Court. If most
Americans believed that the Republicans had already unpacked the
Court and then packed it, even though they never passed a statute
changing the Court’s size, then most Democrats in the political
branches would presumably not be so resistant to the idea of adding
seats to the Court. Put differently, if Republicans had terminated the
Senate filibuster and actually packed the Court, then President Biden
would almost certainly not have appointed a commission to analyze
debates over reform proposals; he would have instead led the charge
for the Democrats to respond in kind.
A refusal by Republican Senators to allow any Supreme Court
appointments by the Democrats for years (perhaps for the duration of
a Hillary Clinton presidency) might have, at some point, been
functionally somewhat similar to Court-unpacking. But pulling this off
would have required the Republicans to continuously control the
Senate for all of these years. Moreover, the actual packing (that is, the
filling of the seat or seats) would have then required them to win the
presidency—although even then they would have had no control over
the number of seats they could have filled. By contrast, what the
Republicans actually did—block a Democratic appointment in the last
year of Obama’s presidency and then confirm President Trump’s
appointee—required them to control the Senate for four years and to

238. Then-Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell firmly rejected then-President Trump’s
idea of eliminating the Senate filibuster as to legislation. See Aaron Blake, Trump Asks for More
Power. Here’s Why the Senate GOP Will Resist., WASH. POST (May 30, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/05/02/3-reasons-the-gop-wont-nuke-the-filibusterand-give-trump-more-power [https://perma.cc/3WBJ-EN96].
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win the presidency for one term. It may make political sense
rhetorically for proponents of Court-packing to characterize their
proposals as merely offering a proportionate response to previous
Republican unpacking and then packing of the Court, but that is not
what they are. Court-packing requires a party to win the presidency for
only one term and to control the Senate and the House for only two
years. Then the party can add as many seats as it wills.
2. Legitimacy Restoration. There is little doubt that the Court’s
legitimacy has suffered greatly in the minds of legal progressives over
the past several years. This conclusion is evidenced, among other
things, by the many progressives discussed or cited in this Article
advocating Court-packing and other major, structural reforms.239
Beyond just progressives, it is also true that the Court’s approval rating
has been declining significantly, especially since the leak of the Court’s
draft majority opinion overruling all of its decisions protecting abortion
rights.240 It currently does not appear to be true, however, that the
Court is deciding cases in ways that are legitimacy destroying in the
minds of a large majority of Americans. No doubt, this assessment
could change in the years ahead depending upon how much additional
precedent of great significance the Court rejects in a number of highly
239. For a comprehensive accounting of reform proposals, see generally BIDEN COMM’N
REPORT, supra note 5.
240. A polling summary based upon several sources finds that Americans’ confidence in the
Court has recently dropped substantially:
While public opinion on abortion has remained fairly steady, public opinion on the
Supreme Court has not. According to Gallup data, Americans’ confidence in the court
has been trending mostly downward since peaking in 1988, but it nosedived in the past
year. Last June, Americans’ confidence in the court sat at 36 percent; however, in June
2022 — ahead of the Dobbs decision but after its draft opinion was leaked — it
plummeted to 25 percent. This is the lowest confidence level since Gallup began the
surveys almost 50 years ago, and it was driven primarily by a dramatic drop in
confidence among Democrats and independents.
Zoha Qamar, Americans’ Views on Abortion Are Pretty Stagnant. Their Views on the Supreme
Court Are Not., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 1, 2022, 6:00 AM), https://53eig.ht/3nqCWLY
[https://perma.cc/FX3J-WFF6]; see also Tim Malloy, 66% SAY HISTORY LESSONS FELL SHORT
ON ROLE OF AFRICAN AMERICANS, QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY NATIONAL POLL FINDS; NEARLY
4 IN 10 HAVE FAMILY OR FRIENDS THEY CONSIDER RACIST, THE SUPREME COURT,
QUINNIPIAC UNIV. POLL (Feb. 17, 2022), https://poll.qu.edu/poll-release?releaseid=3836 [https://
perma.cc/6NXZ-EFWY] (finding, inter alia, that the Supreme Court has a 40 percent approval
rating and a 47 percent disapproval rating, with 13 percent not responding); see also Jeffrey M.
Jones, Approval of U.S. Supreme Court Down to 40%, a New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 23,
2021), https://news.gallup.com/poll/354908/approval-supreme-court-down-new-low.aspx [https://
perma.cc/GSV9-UF6N] (finding that the Supreme Court has a 40 percent approval rating and a
53 percent disapproval rating).
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salient areas of constitutional law, including but not limited to voting
rights and access to the democratic process. At present, however, the
soundest conclusion is that packing the Court would not be justified to
restore the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the nation as a whole.
Court-packing remains unpopular.241
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s June 2022 decision in Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Organization offers a sobering reminder that
there may come a point when the Court will have sufficiently lost its
public legitimacy that this Article’s calculus regarding Court-packing
must change. In Dobbs, the Court overruled all of its decisions that had
protected a pregnant woman’s right to abort a nonviable fetus for the
past forty-nine years.242 The Court issued this maximalist decision even
though—as Chief Justice Roberts emphasized in his concurrence in the
judgment—it was unnecessary to discard so much case law to decide
the case in favor of Mississippi’s fifteen-week ban.243 There was no
compelling reason to overturn a half-century of precedent protecting
individual rights against majoritarian interference, especially because
doing so was contrary to the views of a supermajority of Americans.244
And there was compelling reason not to be so aggressive, given the
enormous reliance interests at stake for the tens of millions of women
and transgender men of childbearing age in the United States—
reliance interests that the Court dismissed as not sufficiently akin to

241. See Giulia Carbonaro, Expanding Supreme Court Opposed by Americans, Even After
Roe Decision: Poll, NEWSWEEK (June 28, 2022, 8:45 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/
expanding-supreme-court-opposed-americans-roe-poll-1719806 [https://perma.cc/94F9-BJSW]
(reporting the results of an NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist Poll conducted on June 24–25, 2022,
which found that despite the Court’s unpopular ruling in Dobbs, respondents oppose expansion
of the Supreme Court by a margin of 54 percent to 34 percent); Sen, supra note 117 (citing earlier
data on the unpopularity of Court-packing).
242. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242–43 (2022).
243. Id. at 2316 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court’s decision to
overrule Roe and Casey is a serious jolt to the legal system—regardless of how you view those
cases. A narrower decision rejecting the misguided viability line would be markedly less
unsettling, and nothing more is needed to decide this case.”).
244. Majority of Public Disapproves of Supreme Court’s Decision to Overturn Roe v. Wade,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 6, 2022), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/07/06/majority-ofpublic-disapproves-of-supreme-courts-decision-to-overturn-roe-v-wade [https://perma.cc/
GN9R-QPDC] (“Public support for legal abortion remains largely unchanged since before the
decision [to overrule Roe], with 62% saying it should be legal in all or most cases.”).
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the reliance interests present in contract and property disputes, which
has never been the relevant metric.245
In addition, the Court’s articulated rationale for overturning Roe
v. Wade, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
and all their doctrinal progeny was so breathtakingly broad—abortion
is not protected because it is not deeply rooted in American history and
tradition246—that the Court repeatedly resorted to ipse dixit, not legal
reasoning, to reassure the country that it did not really mean what it
was saying in the context of any judicially protected liberty right other
than abortion.247 Also not deeply rooted in history and tradition are
protection from involuntary sterilization; contraception; various forms
of intimacy between consenting adults, including same-sex intimacy;
and the right to marry someone of the same sex.248 Only time will tell
whether the Court issues more decisions like Dobbs and whether

245. Compare Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2276 (“[T]his Court is ill-equipped to assess generalized
assertions about the national psyche. Casey’s notion of reliance thus finds little support in our
cases, which instead emphasize very concrete reliance interests, like those that develop in cases
involving property and contract rights.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), with
id. at 2346 (Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., dissenting) (internal quotation marks, citations, and
footnote omitted):
While many of this Court’s cases addressing reliance have been in the commercial
context, none holds that interests must be analogous to commercial ones to warrant
stare decisis protection. This unprecedented assertion is, at bottom, a radical claim to
power. By disclaiming any need to consider broad swaths of individuals’ interests, the
Court arrogates to itself the authority to overrule established legal principles without
even acknowledging the costs of its decisions for the individuals who live under the law,
costs that this Court’s stare decisis doctrine instructs us to privilege when deciding
whether to change course.
246. Id. at 2253 (majority opinion) (“The inescapable conclusion is that a right to abortion is
not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions.”).
247. Id. at 2277–78 (“Nothing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on
precedents that do not concern abortion.”). The problem with this reassurance is that whether a
right is deeply rooted in history and tradition has nothing to do with whether a constitutional
claim involves a fetus.
248. For a discussion of the sweeping nature of the so-called Glucksberg test, see Dahlia
Lithwick & Neil S. Siegel, The Lawlessness of the Dobbs Decision, SLATE (June 27, 2022, 2:58
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/06/dobbs-decision-glucksberg-test-lawlessness.html
[https://perma.cc/PE2U-RKLG]. The Court seems unlikely to overrule the holding in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), that bans on interracial marriage violate equal protection, although it
is not clear what the originalist or traditionalist warrant is for this holding. See Dobbs, 142 S. Ct.
at 2277–78. Given the invocation of the Glucksberg test in Dobbs, the Court now appears
committed to the position that the fundamental right to marry protected under substantive due
process does not include the right of a nonwhite person to marry a white person because bans on
such marriages went as far back as the days of slavery. See id. at 2243. The Court’s apparent
rejection of the second, fundamental-rights holding in Loving is deeply sobering.
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enough Americans become sufficiently upset that the political
branches respond.
For at least three reasons, however, Dobbs itself does not
ultimately change the current calculus regarding the advisability of
Court-packing. First, most Americans and Democratic politicians in
the White House and Congress do not appear nearly as outraged by
the decision as they would have to be to support the radical response
of Court-packing. The Court is substantially less popular than it was
before the leak of the draft Dobbs majority opinion, but it does not
appear to have yet provoked a legitimacy crisis outside progressive
circles.249
Second, the issue of abortion is arguably unique in the extent to
which it has divided the two political parties and impacted
confirmation politics for decades. Rather than being an issue that
stands apart from mainstream partisan disagreements, it is the
quintessential mainstream partisan disagreement. If such
disagreements justify Court-packing, then Court-packing is routinely
justified and any legitimacy-enhancing effect of Court-packing would
be limited to one side of the aisle and have the opposite effect on the
other side. For these reasons, the Republican Party would not have
been justified in packing the Court to overrule Roe and Casey at any
time since 1973. It is therefore not clear why the Democratic Party
would be justified in packing the Court now to overrule Dobbs.
Third, for Americans (like this Author250) who believe that access
to abortion is a fundamental right protected under the Fifth
Amendment and Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, Dobbs
249. See, e.g., Carbonaro, supra note 241 (reporting that “[m]any progressive Democrats,
including Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Pramila Jayapal, Mondaire Jones, Ayanna
Pressley, and Ilhan Omar, Senators Ed Markey and Elizabeth Warren, and New York City Mayor
Eric Adams have called for an expansion of the Supreme Court,” but that “[o]n June 25, White
House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre told reporters that [President] Biden said he ‘does not
agree with’ expanding the number of seats in the court”).
250. See generally Neil S. Siegel, The Pregnant Captain, the Notorious REG, and the Vision
of RBG: The Story of Struck v. Secretary of Defense, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE
STORIES (Melissa Murray, Katherine Shaw & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2019) (discussing the
connections between pregnancy discrimination and sex discrimination and between sex
discrimination and restrictions on access to contraception and abortion); Neil S. Siegel & Reva B.
Siegel, Equality Arguments for Abortion Rights, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 160 (2013)
(articulating and defending equal-protection arguments for abortion rights, which complement
liberty arguments); Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional
Vision, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 799 (2009) (discussing reproductive rights as a necessity for social,
economic, and political equality).
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is a serious blow. It is a much greater blow to the economically
vulnerable women and transgender men who will die or otherwise be
physically or emotionally harmed as a result of the decision. But these
tragic facts do not change the substantial risk that Court-packing would
severely damage the institution of judicial review in the United
States—an institution whose legitimacy made Roe and Casey possible
in the first place, and an institution whose legitimacy will be required
in the future to again protect abortion rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. We are not at the end of history with respect
to the judicial protection of abortion rights in America.
Although legitimacy restoration is ultimately a matter of what
Americans living today believe about the Court, another way to try to
get some traction on this question is to compare the current Court’s
decision-making with that of past Courts. As noted earlier,251 the Court
in 1937 was issuing decisions that were substantially more sweeping
than anything the current Court has done to date, with the possible
exception of Dobbs. Yet Court-packing was deemed inappropriate in
1937. Similarly, the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore252 effectively
decided a presidential election and caused many academic
commentators to question the Court’s legitimacy.253 Yet there was no
serious talk of packing the Court in response to the decision.
3. National Crisis. Some proponents of Court-packing do not cite
just the recent behavior of Senate Republicans with respect to
Supreme Court nominations as potentially distinguishing current
Court-packing proposals from past ones. They also cite actions of the
Republican Party that they claim undermine U.S. democracy, and they
cite decisions of the Court that uphold or enable some of these
actions.254 These actions or decisions include the purging of
professional Republican election officials from their oversight roles
and their replacement by Trump loyalists who erroneously assert that
the 2020 presidential election was stolen;255 the voting regulations being

251. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (quoting Pildes, supra note 36, at 129–30).
252. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
253. See generally, e.g., BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman
ed., 2002) (collecting generally harsh scholarly reaction to Bush v. Gore).
254. For examples of such criticism, see supra note 7.
255. See, e.g., Charles Homans, In Bid for Control of Elections, Trump Loyalists Face Few
Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/11/us/politics/trust-inelections-trump-democracy.html [https://perma.cc/C9FY-Q8XX] (noting that “[a]ccording to a
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passed by state legislatures with Republican majorities that are
condemned by voting rights activists as disfavoring Americans likely to
vote Democratic;256 and decisions by the Court that critics describe as
antidemocratic—cases that fracture the Justices according to the party
affiliation of the Presidents who appointed them.257 These
developments are occurring notwithstanding the absence of credible
evidence of significant in-person voter fraud.258 The greater the extent
to which the Republican Party is likely to succeed in entrenching itself
in power by antidemocratic means, and the greater the role of the
Court in producing that result, the stronger the argument for packing
the Court now, while there is still time. If we are truly witnessing the
death of U.S. democracy, and if the Court is complicit in its demise,
then Democrats will not be able to do what the Democratic Party did
after 1937 and what the Republican Party did after President Reagan’s

May Reuters/Ipsos poll, more than 60 percent of Republicans now believe the 2020 election was
stolen”; “[t]his belief has informed a wave of mobilization at both grass-roots and elite levels in
the party with an eye to future elections”; and “[i]n races for state and county-level offices with
direct oversight of elections, Republican candidates coming out of the Stop the Steal movement
are running competitive campaigns, in which they enjoy a first-mover advantage in electoral
contests that few partisans from either party thought much about before last November”).
256. See, e.g., Nick Corasaniti, Voting Rights and the Battle over Elections: What To Know,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2021) [hereinafter Corasaniti, Voting Rights], https://www.nytimes.com/
article/voting-rights-tracker.html [https://perma.cc/9GCY-EDRW]; see generally, e.g., CAROL
ANDERSON, ONE PERSON, NO VOTE: HOW VOTER SUPPRESSION IS DESTROYING OUR
DEMOCRACY 13 (2018) (arguing that recent Republican-enacted state and local voting laws
“systematically blocked African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans from the polls” in
the 2016 election); Michael Wines, The Student Vote Is Surging. So Are Efforts To Suppress It.,
N.Y. T IMES (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/24/us/voting-college-suppress
ion.html [https://perma.cc/V23U-K8Z4] (arguing that aspects of Republican-enacted voter laws
aim to restrict the ability of college students to vote).
257. See Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2342 (2021) (narrowly
construing § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) in upholding Arizona’s exclusion of ballots cast
at the wrong precinct and its ban on ballot harvesting); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484,
2508 (2019) (holding that challenges to partisan gerrymanders present nonjusticiable political
questions); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (invalidating the coverage formula
in § 4(b) of the VRA, thereby rendering inoperative the preclearance requirement in § 5);
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370–71 (2010) (holding that because political spending is
protected speech, government may not prohibit corporations or unions from spending money to
support or denounce candidates in elections). Justice John Paul Stevens, a Republican appointed
by President Gerald Ford in the 1970s, joined the Democratic appointees in Citizens United and
had become reliably liberal by then.
258. See generally, e.g., LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD 5 (2010)
(arguing that fraudulent voting is quite rare and is instead a politically motivated myth designed
to reduce voter turnout).
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election in 1980—namely, continue to win elections and to nominate
and confirm Justices of their own choosing.259
Democrats—and all Americans who believe in democracy—are
right to worry about current Republican efforts to win elections
through antidemocratic means. It is alarming that, as a result of a
campaign of lying led by former President Donald Trump, only 21
percent of Republicans believe that President Biden’s election was
legitimate.260 These concerns justify investing great energy in political
mobilization and voting; in pressuring Congress to pass legislation that
would address urgent voting rights problems (which, to reiterate,
would be easier to accomplish politically than Court-packing),261
including by overriding the Court’s overly narrow interpretation (in
this Author’s view) of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act262; in
condemning some of the Court’s decisions; and in encouraging leftleaning Americans who have not thought much about judges to care
about them. At the same time, Court-packing is a radical solution, and
the burden is on those who would pack the Court to make the case that
this radical solution is now justified.
The Court’s failure to police partisan gerrymandering in Rucho v.
Common Cause263 does not justify Court-packing. The Court has never
invalidated a redistricting plan as an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander, so the Court’s critics want it to act affirmatively in ways
that it has not done before, even though its past failure to act
affirmatively in this way was never thought to justify Court-packing.

259. For advocacy of Court-packing along these lines, see Gertner & Tribe, supra note 13.
260. Lane Cuthbert & Alexander Theodoridis, Do Republicans Really Believe Trump Won
the 2020 Election? Our Research Suggests They Do., WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2022), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/07/republicans-big-lie-trump [https://perma.cc/9RQYJ7XK].
261. See, e.g., Freedom To Vote Act, S. 2747, 117th Cong. (2021); John R. Lewis Voting
Rights Advancement Act of 2021, H.R. 4, 117th Cong.
262. Voting Rights Act of 1965 ch. 2, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
The provisions at issue in Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021), may well
have been lawful under § 2 of the VRA; the Biden administration concluded that they were. Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14, Brnovich v. Democratic
Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021) (Nos. 19-1257, 19-1258), 2020 WL 7231896. Justice Alito’s
majority opinion is nonetheless concerning because it significantly watered down § 2’s disparateimpact standard and wholly endorsed Republican concerns about voter fraud. For analysis, see
Michael C. Dorf, The Troubling Implications of the SCOTUS Arizona Voting Rights Case,
VERDICT (July 7, 2021), https://verdict.justia.com/2021/07/07/the-troubling-implications-of-thescotus-arizona-voting-rights-case [https://perma.cc/B374-UT5W].
263. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
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As for Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,264 the
Democrats fundraise just as effectively as the Republicans, and the
Democrats appear to have benefited more from “dark money” recently
than have the Republicans.265 It is therefore not the case that Citizens
United is responsible for the entrenchment of Republican rule.
The greatest risk to democracy at present is that lies about voter
fraud or other asserted “legal irregularities” will enable the Republican
presidential candidate in 2024 to lose the election but steal it through
politicized state-election officials who manipulate vote counting, or
through Republican-led state legislatures that reject the popular vote
in their states and submit alternative slates of presidential electors to
the Electoral College.266 What seems most likely to prevent such
attacks on U.S. democracy from succeeding is a broad-based coalition
of people—including progressives, moderate liberals, independents,
and democracy-defending Republicans—who are all prepared to put
profound policy differences aside by voting for, and otherwise
supporting, the Democratic presidential candidate should the
alternative be former President Trump or another candidate who is
antidemocratic.267 As political scientist Daniel Ziblatt has observed,
this approach worked in the past in some European democracies when
parties that were not willing to play by democratic rules sought to gain
power and undermine democracy.268
A key question then is whether Court-packing would make it
more or less likely for such a coalition to form. One cannot know the

264. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
265. Kenneth P. Vogel & Shane Goldmacher, Democrats Decried Dark Money. Then They
Won with It in 2020., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/29/us/politics
/democrats-dark-money-donors.html [https://perma.cc/C2FZ-GPG5].
266. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, No One Is Coming To Save Us from the ‘Dagger at the Throat
of America,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/07/opinion/trumpdemocracy-voting-jan-6.html [https://perma.cc/T25H-2P59] (detailing this risk); David Leonhardt,
Republicans for Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/06/
briefing/republicans-democracy-capitol-attack.html [https://perma.cc/Q4FA-G64L] (same); see
William Baude, The Real Enemies of Democracy, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 2407, 2408 (2021) (“The
real enemies [of democracy] are those who resist the peaceful transfer of power, those who
subvert the hardwired law of succession in office.”).
267. See Hasen, supra note 266 (arguing that “Democrats should not try to go it alone in
preserving free and fair elections” (italics removed)); Leonhardt, supra note 266 (writing that
“[t]he experience of other countries does offer some lessons about how to defeat antidemocratic
movements,” and “[t]he most successful approach involves building coalitions of people who
disagree, often vehemently, on many issues but who all believe in democracy”).
268. Leonhardt, supra note 266 (quoting Professor Ziblatt).

SIEGEL PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

9/16/2022 11:52 AM

THE TROUBLE WITH COURT-PACKING

151

answer with certainty, but it would likely turn primarily on the
reactions of democracy-defending Republicans to Court-packing,
because they are the ones who are most likely to be alienated by it.
There is a real risk that they would regard Court-packing as so extreme
that they would be unwilling to enable such a coalition. This is
especially so because democracy-attacking Republicans would likely
argue that if the Democrats could take the radical step of packing the
Court, then Republican-led legislatures could take the unusual step of
rejecting the popular vote in their states and choosing their own slate
of electors. “Neither move is illegal,” they might well insist.269
Some advocates of Court-packing may respond that such a
coalition would be impossible to form anyway, given how few
Republican politicians are willing to publicly reject former President
Trump’s lies about the 2020 election. But that counsel of despair leads
nowhere worth going. As Professor Richard Hasen reminds us, “it took
Republican election officials, elected officials, and judges to stand up
against an attempted coup in 2020.”270 “A coalition with the minority
of Republicans willing to stand up for the rule of law is the best way to
try to erect barriers to a stolen election in 2024,” he continues, “even if
those Republicans do not stand with Democrats on voting rights or
other issues.”271
It is also questionable to say that the Democrats need to pack the
Court now so that the Court can protect against possible fraud or other
antidemocratic maneuvers in the next presidential election. It seems
perilous to rely on a 7–6 packed, liberal Court on the back end of an
election to save U.S. democracy. Such a Court may not be in a position
to solve the problem, and such a Court may be defied even if it is. It
might well be riskier for a Trumpian to defy the current 6–3
conservative Court.
Beyond this nightmare scenario, it is speculative to believe that
the Republicans will render the Democrats uncompetitive in elections.
From an individual perspective, the denial of the practical ability of any
eligible American to vote is deeply troubling. But from a systemic
perspective, the situation appears far less troubling. Democratic
candidates fundraise and run on the issue of voting rights and voter

269. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (providing that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors” (emphasis added)).
270. Hasen, supra note 266.
271. Id.
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suppression.272 Some of the more extreme measures to date are in
states (like Arkansas) that are not competitive.273 Some of the most
competitive states (like Michigan) have become more democratic
through the use of independent redistricting commissions.274 Some red
and blue states (like Kentucky and New Jersey) have also become
more democratic by adding more days of early voting and offering the
opportunity to register online.275 Some Republican measures may
backfire because many Republicans in rural areas have traditionally
preferred to vote by mail, and they may end up more burdened by
restrictions on voting by mail than Democratic voters in cities and
suburbs.276 In states that are the main focus of controversy, voting
remains accessible; for example, Georgia provides up to nineteen days
of early voting and no-excuse absentee voting.277 There is little or no
evidence that a number of controversial Republican measures,
including voter identification laws, have much effect, because they
impact individuals who have a low propensity to vote anyway.278
Although both Republicans and Democrats have long been convinced
that higher turnout will hurt Republicans and help Democrats, “there

272. See, e.g., DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., 2020 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM 6 (2020),
https://democrats.org/where-we-stand/party-platform [https://perma.cc/N9J3-CQJJ] (“We must
steel and strengthen our democracy, not distort and debase it. Democrats believe there is nothing
to fear from the voices and votes of the American people. We will restore the full power of the
Voting Rights Act and stamp out voter suppression in all its forms.”). As one observer has
recognized:
The laws have met an impassioned response from voting rights groups, which are
working to inform voters about the new restrictions while also hiring lawyers to
challenge them.
Democrats hope that their voters will be impassioned enough in response to the
new restrictions that they turn out in large numbers to defeat Republicans in
November.
Corasaniti, Voting Rights, supra note 256.
273. Corasaniti, Voting Rights, supra note 256.
274. Nick Corasaniti, Ungerrymandered: Michigan’s Maps, Independently Drawn, Set Up Fair
Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/29/us/politics/michigancongressional-maps.html [https://perma.cc/H7XM-NX8G].
275. Corasaniti, Voting Rights, supra note 256.
276. Id.
277. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-385(d) (2021) (early voting); id. § 21-2-380(b) (no-excuse
absentee voting).
278. For discussion of the impact of voter identification laws, see generally Emily Rong
Zhang, Questioning Questions in the Law of Democracy: What the Debate over Voter ID Laws’
Effects Teaches About Asking the Right Questions, 69 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).

SIEGEL PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

9/16/2022 11:52 AM

THE TROUBLE WITH COURT-PACKING

153

is no evidence that turnout is correlated with partisan vote choice.”279
Surveying studies published over the past decade, blogger and
journalist Matthew Yglesias concludes that “[t]he key perversity of the
voting rights debate is that it’s based on a delusion shared by
Democrats and Republicans that making it inconvenient to vote
benefits Republicans.”280
Political scientist Alan Abramowitz has examined data on voter
turnout and vote margins in the 2020 presidential election. He finds
that voter turnout and voting decisions “were driven by the strong
preferences held by the large majority of voters between the major
party candidates.”281 Moreover, this “is very likely to be the case again
in the 2022 midterm elections and especially in the 2024 presidential
election.”282 He therefore concludes that efforts by Republicancontrolled state legislatures to suppress Democratic turnout “by
imposing restrictions on absentee voting, early in-person voting, and
use of drop boxes or by requiring that voters present photo
identification in order to vote are unlikely to bear fruit.”283
It is also speculative to think that the current Court will only ever
abet the degradation of U.S. democracy. As noted, the Court
performed well in 2020.284 The Court also stood up to Trump and, by
lopsided majorities, rejected some of his aggressive assertions of
executive power.285 Moreover, even a very conservative Court does not

279. Daron R. Shaw & John R. Petrocik, Does High Voter Turnout Help One Party?, 49
NAT’L AFFAIRS 3, 3 (2021), https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/does-high-voterturnout-help-one-party [https://perma.cc/YL6P-L6ZM].
280. Matthew Yglesias, The False “Trap” of Bipartisanship, SLOW BORING (Jan. 19, 2022),
https://www.slowboring.com/p/electoral-count-act [https://perma.cc/45BD-YAK8].
281. Alan I. Abramowitz, Why Voter Suppression Probably Won’t Work, SABATO’S
CRYSTAL BALL (Feb. 3, 2022), https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/why-voter-suppres
sion-probably-wont-work [https://perma.cc/N4CF-N54K].
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See supra note 68.
285. See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431 (2020) (holding 7–2 that Article II and the
Supremacy Clause do not categorically preclude, or require a heightened standard for, the
issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting president); Trump v. Mazars USA, 140 S. Ct.
2019, 2036 (2020) (holding 7–2 that although congressional subpoenas for the president’s
information may be enforceable, the court below did not take adequate account of the significant
separation of powers concerns implicated by subpoenas from the House of Representatives
seeking President Trump’s financial records).
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benefit from the erosion of democracy. Authoritarians usually come
for the courts.286
Some historical perspective may also be helpful. U.S. election
procedures have always been flawed. Political parties have sometimes
sought to win elections partly through antidemocratic means. There
have been past instances of democratic backsliding. The country has
never lived up to its democratic ideals.287 None of this has been thought
to justify Court-packing.
Accordingly, Court-packing does not appear appropriate at this
time. There is not currently a national crisis to which the Court is
contributing that is on par with rebellion against the Union,
entrenchment of a political party through antidemocratic means, or
theft of a presidential election. These considerations help explain why
Court-packing does not seem politically viable at present.
C. What about the Costs of Defeat and the Risk of Nonreciprocity?
The existence of significant methodological or ideological
differences between the two political parties raises concerns about the
costs of defeat incurred by the party that has appointed a minority of
Justices until the Court’s composition becomes more favorable. These
differences between the parties also raise concerns about whether
decisions not to pack the Court will generate reciprocity from the other
party. This Section considers these objections.
One could insist that this Article has not grappled sufficiently with
just how divided the two political parties are in the contemporary era
of U.S. politics. On one view, they are divided over what the
Constitution means and how to carry it into effect—that is, how to do
law. According to this position, relative to decades past, there is
substantially less overlap between the methodologies used by the
Republican appointees (that is, originalism and textualism) and those
used by the Democratic appointees (that is, evolutionary theories of
constitutional interpretation and purposivism), and these differences

286. See Kosa & Šipulová, supra note 58 (noting that “court-packing has flourished all over
the world” in authoritarian regimes).
287. For a history of periodic expansions and contractions of voting rights, see generally
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES (2000).
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are substantially more entrenched.288 Alternatively, if one believes that
the methodological differences are more apparent than real,289 or that
interpretive methodologies are often significantly underdeterminate,290 then this objection can be reframed in terms of
ideological attitudes. On this view, this Article does not sufficiently
register how far apart the two parties are ideologically and thus how
much they disagree about the attractiveness of the outcomes of
particular Supreme Court decisions.291 A third view is that the parties
are divided both methodologically and ideologically.292 One possible
variant of this position might be that the methodological divide matters
more to legal elites and that ideological disagreements matter more to
activists and voters, even if ideological differences also matter to legal
elites.
Whether the objection that this Article underappreciates current
partisan divisions is cashed out in terms of methodology, ideology, or
some combination of the two, it is potentially persuasive for at least
two reasons. First, the greater the distance between the two parties, the

288. On theories of constitutional interpretation, see FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 146, at
60–76. On textualism, see generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). On purposivism, see generally STEPHEN
BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW (2010) and ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014).
289. For example, Justice Kagan has textualist commitments. See, e.g., Yates v. United States,
574 U.S. 528, 553 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[C]onventional tools of statutory construction
all lead to a more conventional result: A ‘tangible object’ is an object that’s tangible.”). Likewise,
Chief Justice Roberts can be a purposivist, such as when he underscored the basic purpose of the
Affordable Care Act in rejecting a major statutory challenge to the availability of federal
subsidies for eligible Americans seeking to purchase health insurance in the many exchanges
created by the federal government:
Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not
to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent
with the former, and avoids the latter. Section 36B can fairly be read consistent with
what we see as Congress’s plan, and that is the reading we adopt.
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
290. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 849, 869 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 288) (“In most cases,
methodology is too indeterminate—and the differences between the competing theories too
subtle—to drive outcomes.”).
291. See, e.g., supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing the attitudinalist model of
judicial decision-making).
292. See Gary Lawson, What Is “United” About the United States, 101 B.U. L. REV. 1793,
1793, 1797–98 (2021) (asking whether deep disagreements on such basic questions as the nature
and purpose of law and the meaning of the public good imply that “the very idea of the ‘United
States’ as a political entity [is] a profound mistake that is not worth preserving”).
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higher the stakes with respect to which party “controls” the Court.
Given increased partisan and affective polarization, increased
ideological sorting of conservatives and liberals into the Republican
and Democratic Parties (respectively), and heightened focus on
appointing “reliable” Justices, each party may have good reason to fear
that it will often lose big on the issues about which it cares most—
unlike during most of the twentieth century, when the country did not
have ideological parties.293 Second, the greater the distance between
the two parties, the lower the likelihood that a party will trust that if it
declines to pack the Court when it has appointed a minority of Justices
and has the opportunity, the other party will show similar restraint
when the tables have turned. A common argument of current
advocates of Court-packing is that there is no point in holding back
because the Republicans will pack the Court as soon as they feel the
need and have the authority.294
The “costs of defeat” counterargument has, however, already
been addressed. In the current, hyper-polarized era of U.S. politics, this
counterargument will always justify Court-packing, and once the first
Court-packing statute is passed, the Court’s legitimacy and efficacy will
suffer greatly. The potential benefit to one side of temporarily seizing
control of the Court is likely lower than the potential cost of not having
a Court worth packing.
The same considerations are relevant in considering concerns
about a lack of reciprocity. There is a risk that the Republicans will try

293. See generally ERIC SCHICKLER, RACIAL REALIGNMENT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1932–1965 (2016) (documenting the gradual transformation over the
course of the twentieth century from a two-party system in which each party had conservative and
liberal wings to a two-party system in which the parties were divided ideologically over civil rights
and economic policy). “Polarization” refers to the increasing adoption over time of more extreme
policy positions and ideological orientations by groups. NOLAN MCCARTY, POLARIZATION:
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 8–11 (2019). “Partisan polarization” exists when such views
are increasingly adopted by members of the Republican and Democratic Parties. Id. at 10–11. If
there is increasing policy or ideological polarization between liberals (who are characteristically
Democrats) and conservatives (who are characteristically Republicans), then the phenomenon is
polarization. But if liberal and conservative voters increasingly sort themselves into the parties
without an increase in policy or ideological polarization, then the phenomenon is partisan sorting.
Id. at 11–12, 15. Finally, “affective polarization” refers to the tendency of voters in one party to
dislike voters in the other. See id. at 61–63.
294. See, e.g., Klarman, Court Expansion, supra note 7, at 16 (“It cannot be a persuasive
argument against Democrats’ expanding the Court that Republicans will simply retaliate in kind
one day. Republicans have amply demonstrated that they will break the norm against Court
expansion when it suits them to do so, regardless of how Democrats behave.”).
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to pack the Court at some point. Moreover, if there is a good chance
that the other party will destroy the Court, it might make sense to be
the party to get there first. At the same time, it is very difficult to know
how high this risk is. It is not clear why packing the Court—and thereby
risking its continued legitimacy and efficacy—is in either party’s selfinterest when the victory might prove short-lived as nullification efforts
began and the other party ran against an extraordinarily aggressive
political act that is unpopular with most Americans. Fighting too hard
to win the game may end up making the game no longer worth playing
for both sides. This characteristic of the strategic interaction between
the parties may help explain why unified Republican government
during the Bush II and Trump presidencies did not produce serious talk
of packing the Court, notwithstanding numerous decisions of the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts since 1990 that many (albeit not all)
Republicans have condemned,295 including in the areas of abortion,296

295. Because political parties are not monoliths, the list in the text oversimplifies matters.
Many Republicans may approve of, or be indifferent to, some decisions on this list, and only legal
elites within the party may be aware of others. Nonetheless, it is sound to observe that the
Republican Party, however reasonably defined, has also condemned numerous Supreme Court
decisions over the past several decades. The list roughly illustrates this point. For the sake of
completeness, it includes a few decisions rendered after the end of unified Republican
government in 2019. This Article will not attempt to document Republican criticism of all of the
decisions in these areas, but the ideological disagreements between the two parties with respect
to most of the areas have long been well publicized. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION,
REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, at 9–12, 13–15, 40 (2016), https://prod-cdnstatic.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL%5B1%5D-ben_1468872234.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3R8P-V3SF] (condemning, inter alia, “unfair preferences, quotas, and set-asides as
forms of discrimination,” “the long line of activist decisions – including Roe, Obergefell, and the
Obamacare cases,” “[t]he Supreme Court’s Kelo decision,” and “the Supreme Court’s erosion of
the right of the people to enact capital punishment in their states,” while championing, inter alia,
religious liberty and “the appointment of judges who respect traditional family values and the
sanctity of innocent human life”). This Article references the 2016 platform, not the 2020
platform, because the Republican Party in 2020 elected not to amend the 2016 platform.
REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., RESOLUTION REGARDING THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
PLATFORM (2020), https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/docs/Resolution_Platform_2020.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4Q3G-GDQ4].
296. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833–34 (1992), overruled
by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S.
914, 914 (2000), abrogated by Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. 2228; Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136
S. Ct. 2292, 2292–93 (2016), abrogated by Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. 2228; June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v.
Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2104 (2020), abrogated by Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. 2228.

SIEGEL PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

158

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/16/2022 11:52 AM

[Vol. 72:71

gay rights and transgender rights,297 the Free Exercise Clause,298 the
Establishment Clause,299 capital punishment,300 criminal sentences of
life without the possibility of parole,301 affirmative action,302 the
Takings Clause,303 terrorism,304 and the Affordable Care Act.305
Indeed, higher partisan stakes for appointments does not just
increase the costs of defeat and heighten fears about a lack of
reciprocity. It also increases the temptation to pack the Court if a party
has appointed a minority of Justices and has the opportunity with
unified government to add enough Justices to secure a majority. This
is a good reason to expect an arms race once Court-packing is put on
the table. In other words, some of the same reasons that are invoked to
justify Court-packing in the current political environment suggest that
packing the Court would not long succeed.

297. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 620–21 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
558 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 745–47 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584, 2585 (2015); Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1731 (2020). As noted earlier,
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, is a tricky example because it inspired both opposition
and support within the Republican Party. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872–73 (1990); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 507–09 (1997); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 712–13 (2004). The hostile reaction to
Smith was broad and bipartisan, leading to enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 (“RFRA”), 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4),
whose proper interpretation today is deeply disputed. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780–83 (2014) (holding 5–4 that federal regulations requiring employers to
provide their female employees with no-cost access to contraception violated RFRA in an asapplied challenge by closely held corporations).
299. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 577 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch.
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 687 (1994); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 290
(2000); McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 845–47 (2005).
300. See e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
551 (2005); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 407 (2008).
301. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 460 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.
Ct. 718, 719 (2016).
302. See e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin
(Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2198–99 (2016).
303. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency 535 U.S. 302, 302 (2002); Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct.
1933, 1933 (2017).
304. See e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 466–67 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
507–508 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 557–58 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 723 (2008).
305. See e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 521–22 (2012); King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2480 (2015); California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2105 (2021).
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CONCLUSION
Those who advocate Court-packing are upset about how the
current Court came to be. They have reason to be upset. They are also
worried about what the current Court has done and will do. In this
Author’s view, a number of these concerns are warranted, including
with respect to voting rights, access to the democratic process, and
reproductive rights and justice.
The Court’s general performance is intensely controversial,
however, and it will remain so, given how polarized the country is. And
to repeat, if Democrats in the White House and Congress conclude that
such concerns justify Court-packing now, then efforts to nullify
Supreme Court decisions may follow, and Republicans in the political
branches will surely conclude that other concerns justify Court-packing
when they have the power to act. Repeated Court-packing, or repeated
threats of it, would make it increasingly difficult for the Court to
perform functions that no other governmental institution is likely to
perform better. Until the Court exacerbates a national crisis or
alienates a large majority of Americans through extreme decisions
across different areas of jurisprudence that tear at the fabric of modern
constitutional law, the soundest course is to shore up what remains of
the convention against Court-packing, not to dismantle it.306 The
soundest course is to try to maintain three independent branches of
government, not to effectively reduce them to two. Americans who
vigorously oppose the direction in which the Republican Party and the
current Court appear to be headed have less radical means at their
disposal to work toward realization of their own understanding of what
it means to respect the Constitution and those who live under it.

306. See Charles Fried, Opinion, I Was Reagan’s Solicitor General. Here’s What Biden Should
Do with the Court., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/19/
opinion/biden-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/UBC4-RCD4] (“Let’s see whether the
current Supreme Court majority overplays its hand. If it does, then Mr. Biden’s nuclear option
[of enlarging the Court] might not only be necessary but it will be seen to be necessary.”).

